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Abstract 
 
    The aim of this thesis is to present and analyse the role of the environmental groups and the 
trade unions on the issue of the environmental protection through the economic methodology. 
The specific groups have strong connection with the environmental issue since the beginning of 
the environmental movement. However, the two groups stand on different positions in the 
market and in the society, therefore they have different objectives and different tools for the 
achievement of their targets. Following the groups' different characteristics, I analyse their 
targets and how these could influence the firms' technological choice, the level of the production, 
the profits and finally the level of the emissions released by the firms' production. 
    In the second chapter, a deeper analysis on the behavior and the strategy of the 
environmental groups is provided in order to shed more light on their objectives from the 
beginning of the environmental movement. Following a review of the literature an analytical 
framework for studying targets or motivations of the environmental groups is analysed. Three 
interrelated factors which affect the strategy and the decisions of the group are identified; the 
group’s size, their budget and the weight of impure altruism in their individual and collective 
objectives. A positive relation exists between the group’s size and the financial contributions, 
and the interaction of the personal expectations with the collective objectives encourages and 
benefits the group’s actions. 
    In the third chapter following the experience from the real world, the participation of the 
environmental groups in the emissions trading system (ETS) is analysed. Concretely, a 
competition in an ETS as a game between two firms and environmental group is modelled. 
According to the results, there is a U-shape relationship between how polluting the chosen 
technology is and the degree of the environmentalists’ impure altruism. Firms choose a more 
polluting technology in the presence of the environmentalists than in their absence if they are 
characterised by a high enough degree of impure altruism. 
    Finally, in the fourth chapter the influence of the trade unions on the firms' environmental 
technological choice is analysed. However, in addition to the literature and according to the real 
world experience the unions care for the environmental protection. Particularly, the decentralised 
structure is compared with the centralised structure under a Cournot duopoly. I conclude that the 
decentralised structure could always provide higher incentives to the firms for the adoption of a 
better (less polluting) technology. Furthermore, there is an inverse U-shape relation between the 
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firm’s emissions and the size of the market. Finally, the emissions could be less under the 
centralised case compared to the decentralised for relatively low market size. 
 
        Keywords: environmental group; environmentalists’ motivations; group’s size; budget; 
impure altruism, emissions trading systems; trade unions; emissions; technological choice. 
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The global environmental movement has been characterised by the strong
participation and support by the environmental groups (see for example Dun-
lap and Mertig, (1992)) and by the coalition - and as a result the support
- of the trade unions with the environmental groups (e.g. Obach, (2004)).
The presence of the two coalitions in the wide mobilisation for the environ-
mental protection and their role on the environmental policies engendered
the trigger for the writing of the present thesis.
The aim of this research is to provide, through the economic approach,
an analysis for the inuence of the two coalitions (environmental groups and
trade unions) to the market (prots, production, technology, etc.) and to the
environmental quality (environmental protection and level of pollution). The
environmental issue is the channel which connects the two coalitions and the
environmental protection is part of the two coalitionsobjects. In addition,
the environmental issue can inuence the coalitionsdecisions with respect
to their actions for the environmental protection but their actions e¤ect the
rmstechnological choice, production, prots and emissionslevel. However,
although the environmental protection (or concern or interest) is the common
characteristic between the environmental groups and the trade unions, they
use di¤erent tools for the achievement of the environmental targets. For
example, the trade unions could press directly the rms for the reduction of
the emissions (pollution) through the bargaining process with the rms for
the level of the wages or/and the number of the workers. In contrast with the
trade unions, the environmental groups could lobby the government for the
adoption of stringer environmental decisions, could boycott the goods from
the "dirty" rms, also they could use advertisements in T.V. and radio in
order to inform the public for the nature and the origins of the pollution, etc.
Hence, the main di¤erences between the two groups or coalitions are i) their
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available tools for the achievement of the environmental targets and ii) that
the workers could participate in the production of these goods from which
the pollution emanates as a by-product result but the environmentalists may
not participate.
O¤course it is necessary to accept that the di¤erence on the nature of the
two groups o¤er di¤erent tools but also di¤erent targets. Concretely, the two
groups have more targets than the environmental issue. For example, the
trade unionsobjects are the increasing of their memberswages as well as
the rising of the employment. For the environmental groups the extra targets
(except the environmental protection) are the size of the group, the need to
survive, the attraction of support by the public and the individuals, etc. That
is, the di¤erent targets, tools and nature can separate the coalitions from each
other and has di¤erent inuence on the groups and the membersbehavior.
Besides, the using of di¤erent tools for each group could characterise the
strategy, the decisions and the behavior of each coalition, especially for the
case of the environmental groups which they have a plethora of available
tools in their arsenal. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the way and the
circumstances under which the environmentalists take their decisions because
we can shed more light to the environmental groupstechniques or tools and
we could enrich our knowledge with respect to their strategy and behavior.
Therefore, in the second chapter, following the review of the literature, I
analyze the issue of the behavior (like the impure altruism, warm glow feeling,
status, prestige, etc.) on the environmental coalitionsdecisions. Together
with the budget and the size of the group, the impure altruism becomes the
main objective for the environmental groups. The highlights of this research
are the direct and indirect interaction between the size of the budget and the
number of the members in the environmental groups (groups size). Also,
the impure altruism, at individual groups level, could determine the groups
actions (such as forming a lobby) and reduces the level of the free riders but
in the same time increases the e¤ort of the members to the groupsecological
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activities.
In addition, the third chapter presents a new tool for the environmental
group. Specically, the research is related with the third partiesparticipa-
tion in the Emissions Trading System (ETS) in order to study if and how
their participation could a¤ect the rmstechnological choice, the level of
the emissions and the markets equilibrium. Following the usual method-
ology from the industrial organisation I use the oligopoly theory where the
existence of the strategic interaction indicates the use of the game theory
approach. The main scope of this research is to focus on the environmen-
tal groupsparticipation in the tradable permits market when the environ-
mentalists can purchase and withdraw emissions permits from the permits
market. Furthermore, I introduced in the environmental groupsobjectives
some characteristics from the behavioral economics, like the impure altru-
ism, which could give to the research a di¤erent view for the environmental
groupstargets. A main and important result is that; the rms will adopt
the greener (less polluting) technological choice when the environmentalists
are characterized by intermediate values of impure altruism where the level
of the rmsemissions is the lower.
In the fourth chapter, my research is connected with the labor economics
in order to combine the environmental with the labor economic theory. Par-
ticularly, my motivation for this research emanates from the real world expe-
rience and from the cases where the trade unions supports the environmental
policies and reacts against the rmsemissions. In this framework I focus on
the case of the di¤erent unionsstructures (like centralized and decentralized)
where the trade unions will set the level of the wages (following a Right to
Manage model). However, the unions will decide for the level of the wages
according to the damage functions or the level of the environmental damage
from the rmsemissions. Additionally, the model stands on the case of an
oligopoly market where the rms compete for the level of the output. Among
the interesting results is that; the trade unions set higher level of wages to
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the rms with the more polluting technology. Also, the level of the emissions
are lower under the centralised structure than under the decentralised for
relatively low market size. Furthermore, there is an inverse U-shape curve
between the level of pollution and the size of the market. Therefore, the
trade unions can inuence the rmstechnological choice and then the level
of the output and emissions.
4
Literature review
In this chapter I analyse the relevant literature starting from the appli-
cation of the tradable permits market in the European Union and passing
to the presentation of the third parties, and specically the environmental
groups, in the permits market. It is essential to note that the environmen-
tal groupsobjective is to press the rms to adopt a better - less polluting-
technology through the withdrawing of the permits from the permits mar-
ket. Hence, given the issue of the rmstechnological choice, I focus on the
relation of the environmental policy with the technological choice. This is
a relevant topic because the target of the environmental groups is to ac-
celerate the rmsdecision for less polluting technology. So, not only the
environmental policy but also the external factors (like the presentation of
the environmental groups in the permits markets) could inuence the rms
choice with respect to the technology.
Furthermore, in the same spirit, the trade unions are another type of coali-
tion which has the power to inuence the rmstechnological choice. In this
study, I focus on the environmental technology and thus, following some real
cases, on the trade unionsinterest for environmental protection. This is a
crucial point because the organised workers (or the trade unions) participate
in the rmsproduction process -contrary to the case of the environmental
groups- where the emissions are a by-product result from the rmsproduc-
tion. That is, the trade unions bargain with the rms for the wages and/or for
the number of the workers and under the umbrella of the union - environmen-
talism they will bargain for the level of the emissions, too. The trade unions
interest for the environmental protection or the union-environmentalism is a
new factor which could inuence the rmstechnological choice and becomes
an additional issue for the rmsdecisions. Therefore, I analyse the literature
with respect to the inuence of the trade unions on the rms decision for
technological adoption under di¤erent union structures.
The aim of this literature review is to give to the reader the main idea
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and the feeling for the evolution of the analogous research up to the present
day. It is impossible to exhaust all the spectrum of the research with all the
detailed analysis. Thus, the analysis is focused on some relevant and key
studies with respect to the research chapters of this thesis.
European Union Emissions Trading System -
Origins and Applications
The function and the use of European Unions Emission Trading System (EU
ETS hereafter) were reinforced by the Kyoto Protocol (1998) and the e¤orts
by many countries to stop global warming. These countries participated in
the Conference of the Parties (COP) in order to decide on the strategies and
tools against global warming. In 1997 the COP3 took place in Kyoto and its
result was the Kyoto Protocol where the Parties decided to reduce the level
of the greenhouse gases by 5% below the level of the analogous emissions
from the year 1990. The time line for this target is the period 2008 until
2012.
The European Union (15 members-countries) was a leader at the meetings
of COP and ratied the Kyoto Protocol. For the EU the target for emissions
reduction is equal to 8% below the 1990s level of emissions. Therefore, the
EU adopted the Kyoto Protocol and the mechanisms for the control and the
reduction of the total emissions.1 One main instrument intoduced in the
1The mechanisms introduced in the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of the greenhouse
gases (GHG) are; The Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and the Emission Trading (E.T.). The J.I. allows one industrialized country to
reduce part of its emissions by investing in the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG)
in another industrialized country. Both countries should belong to the Annex I parties
according to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
In the Annex I belong these industrialized countries which have quantied targets for
the reduction of GHG. Furthermore CDM allows an Annex I country to reduce part of
itsemissions by investing or run projects for the reduction of the GHG emissions in a
non-Annex I country. Non-Annex I countries are the developing countries without any
specied, quantied target for the reduction of the GHG emissions.
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Protocol was the tradable permits system. For the EU the emissions trading
system became the cornerstone of its environmental policy especially for the
reduction of the CO2 emissions (Convery, 2009). The rst application of the
EU ETS took place in 2005 where 11,500 rms (mainly heavy industries)
participated in the new tool, making the EU ETS the largest application of
tradable permits in the world (e.g. Convery, 2009 and Newbery, 2008). Ac-
cording to the emissions trading system each unit of emission released to the
atmosphere from a rm has to be accompanied by the analogous allowance
or the emission permit from the specic rm, for example one tone of CO2
equals one permit. However the permits are allocated by the government
(regulator) in each country to the rms. Hence the total number of permits
represents the maximum permissible levels of total emissions. Moreover, the
number of the permits which corresponded to each member-state of the Eu-
ropean Union had been decided in 1998. Simply, for each Member the target
for the emissions reduction was di¤erent and all the targets together are equal
to 8% less than the emissions of 1990 for the specic countries. This decision
is known as the burden sharing agreement and according to this agreement
specic number of permits belong to each Member State (see table 1).
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Table 1: Burden Sharing Agreement.
Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/932
Member Targets 200812 under Kyoto Protocol
State and "EU burden sharing" (%)
Austria -13,0
Belgium -7,5
Denmark -21,0
Finland 0,0
France 0,0
Germany -21,0
Greece 25,0
Ireland 13,0
Italy -6,5
Luxembourg -28,0
Netherlands -6,0
Portugal 27,0
Spain 15,0
Sweden 4,0
United Kingdom -12,5
EU-15 -8,0
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Concretely, following the European environmental decisions, each member-
state of the European community has a National Allocation Plan (NAP) for
the allocation of the emissions permits to each industrial sector and rms in
the country. Therefore, the regulator (government) will allocate the permits
to the rms in accordance with each plan. Furthermore, in the context of
the NAPs, the regulator will follow the grandfathered distribution system
in order to share the permits to the rms. In the grandfathered system the
regulator will allocate, free of charge, a specic number of permits to the
rms according to the industrieshistorical emissions. These permits are the
initial permits for each rm. Therefore the total number of the permits in
the European market could not exceed the specic level of emissions.2 Table
2 briey describes all the pieces of the puzzle (meetings, decision, legislations
documents and conferences) from the beginning until the rst application of
the EU ETS.
According to the baseline of the tradable permits, the rms with the initial
permits -allocated by the regulator- can participate in the transactions of the
permits in the analogous market. If a rm has more permits than emissions
for a specic period, then the rm can sell the excess permits through the
permitsmarket to other rm(s) with more emissions than permits. A rm
could purchase extra permits via the permitsmarket if it has more emissions
than permits or could adopt a less polluting technology or/ and may reduce
the level of the output. Finally, the regulator in the end of the specic period
(e.g. 2008-2012) will enforce a penalty to this rm which has more emissions
than permits. Hence, a market for permits could induce rms to nd a
socially desirable outcome and emissions with the governments intervention.
The idea of the tradable permits market is familiar in economic science
2According to the directive 2003/87/EC the European Union has specic target for the
reduction of the emissions in the EU area. For the period 2008-2012 the target is equal to
8% below the amount of emissions from the year 1990. Therefore the total number of the
permits that had been allocated by the regulator to the rms for the period 2008-2012 is
equal to the targets emissions.
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since it has been introduced from Coase (1960) as a possible instrument for
the bilateral negotiations between the polluter and the polluting. Thus, the
use of the permits could drive to an equilibrium level of emissions acceptable
to both sides. Later, Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) built on the Coasian
idea to illustrate the xed quantity of transferable permits as a new instru-
ment for environmental policy. The level of the xed permits represents the
total allowable pollution and the price of the permits could be a motivation
for the polluters to innovate and reduce emissions. Specically, Crocker fo-
cuses mainly on the air pollution in United States and Dales, Canada on
water pollution. However, when the idea of the tradable permits became
more mature more studies focus on the design of markets for transferable
permits: Montgomery, (1972); Mackintosh, (1973); Kneese and Schultze,
(1975); Krupnick et al, (1983) and Baumol and Oates, (1988). In these stud-
ies the authors showed that the system of tradable permits could reach their
environmental targets with minimum cost. The function and the idea of the
tradable permits market was well described by Pearce (2002, pp. 74-75.)
"Given the need to meet some target, say X tonnes of pollution, and the
source of the pollution is Y emitters, distribute permits equal to X tonnes
to the emitters, and then allow them to buy and sell the permits. Because
pollution without a permit is not allowed, each emitter will reduce pollution
so long as the cost of doing so is less than the price that would have to be
paid for a permit. High abatementcost polluters will therefore tend to buy
permits, and low-cost polluters will sell permits. The market in permits will
determine an equilibrium price for the permits."
Then, the idea passed from theory to the real market in USA for the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 under the authority of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for air quality. In the same spirit, the tradable
permits applied for shing quotas, airport landing slots, development rights
for land use, etc. (e.g. Gorman and Solomon, 2002; Pearce, 2002 and Heyes
and Liston, 2006). For a brief early application of emissions trading systems
10
see table 3.
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Table 2: Evolution of the ETS, International Meetings and Legislations.
Source: Convery, 2009.
12
13
14
Table 3: Early application of emissions trading systems.
Source: Gorman and Solomon, 2002.
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Who can participate in the EU ETS?
In this point it is necessary to note that the European tradable permits mar-
ket is open to all the possible players or agents in the market. According to
the European legislation documents and o¢ cial statutory documents every-
one can participate in the European ETS. Therefore, the European Commis-
sions law decisions allowed the participation in the ETS not only to those
who create the pollution but also to the victims who su¤er from this. That
is, the third parties like, the victims from the rmsemissions, Non Gov-
ernmental Organisations (e.g. environmental groups), legal persons, citizens,
consumers, individuals, schools, unions, associations, etc. can participate in
the permits market in order to: a) purchase permits from the market; b) to
sell permits to the market or; c) to purchase and withdraw permits from the
market.
A number of important documents conrm the third parties free entrance
and participation in the emissions trading system. For example; the instruc-
tion COM (2001) 581 Final proposal, allows ecological groups (No Govern-
ment Organizations) to buy and withdraw permits from the market. (Page
12; Paragraph 13, Distribution and Publication of Permits.).3 Also, another
report about the participation by legal persons in permitsmarket originates
from the UNFCCC Guideline (FCCC/CP/2001/2/Add.4.).4 Moreover, in
the Directive 2003/87/E.C. it is clear that any legal or natural person can
3E.C. COM (2001) 581 nal Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within
the community and amending council directive 96/61/EC.
4FCCC/CP/2001/2/Addition 4. Page 27, paragraph 21 (b)). Review of the imple-
mentation of commitments and of other provisions of the convention. Preparations for the
rst session of the conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the parties to the
Kyoto protocol (decision 8/cp.4). Decisions concerning guidelines under articles 5, 7 and
8 of the Kyoto protocol.
16
participate in emission trading market.5
Third parties participation in the ETS
Theoretical papers have focused on the third partiesparticipation in rela-
tion to the regulators decisions problem (the endowment of permits) and the
systems e¢ ciency. The economics approach is based on a common political-
economic-social platform which links the economistsopinion. Specically,
the economists agreeing that an optimal pollution control is possible if the
pollutions damage and the abatement cost of pollution are known to every-
body. Because in the real world it is not possible for the government or
the regulator to know these two parameters several di¤erent theoretical ap-
proaches have been designed, by the researchers, in order to test the tradable
permits e¢ ciency under the third partiesparticipation. In this case the
third parties are disatised with the quantity of emissions and in order to
react against pollution are participating in the permitssystem. Hence, they
could purchase and retire permits. These theoretical papers are analyzed
below.
In Smith and Yates (2003a) rms and citizens purchase permits. The
authors analyzed the case in which the regulator faces uncertainty about
environmental damages and about the citizensparticipation and their col-
lective action problem. They examine this case in a static and a dynamic
model and they present the optimal permits endowments for both cases.
Also, Smith and Yates (2003b) show that consumersparticipation in the
permits market may create a signal for the regulator. If consumers purchase
permits, the initial number of permits is high and the market equilibrium
is ine¢ cient. The regulator can read this signal and can improve the social
5Directive 2003/87/E.C. article 3, paragraph (g) Directive 2003/87/E.C. of the Eu-
ropean parliament and of the council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for green-
house gas emission allowance trading within the community and amending council directive
96/61/E.C.
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welfare in the future.
In an analogous spirit, Shrestha (1998) argues that in the case where the
regulator has uncertainty about the benets or the damage; the environmen-
tal groupsand/or the citizens(victims) participation in ETS can drive the
market into the interior equilibrium point. However, there are two condi-
tions: First ecologists or citizens are allowed to participate in ETS. Second
the marginal benets of ecologists/citizen exceed the price of permits which
is equal to the marginal cost of pollution control.
Malueg and Yates (2006) present two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst
scenario, the citizens lobby the government to reduce the pollution permit
endowment (in opposition to the rmslobby). In the second scenario, the
citizens participate directly in the ETS with the aim of purchasing and re-
tiring permits. In their basic scenario permits are auctioned rather than
grandfathered. They conclude that rms and citizens prefer permits.
Boyd and Conley (1997) and Conley and Smith (2005) consider a market
in which the citizens participate in the permits market. However the retired
permits are not sold at the same prices as in the common market but at
personalized price.
Ahlheim and Schneider (2002) propose a system where the households
can distribute the permits. They support a new sharing system for the
permits allocation. According to this, the permits are distributed rstly
to households free of charge by the regulator and then the households sell
as many permits as they wish, to rms. Then, this new system includes
householdspreferences. Hence, this kind of participation is not parallel with
the rmsaction in the permit market and the permits are not shared by
grandfathered system.
Recently, English and Yates (2007) designed an expansion on the Kwerels
(1977) mechanism adding the citizensdemand for permits. In their conclu-
sions, the Kwerels mechanism is e¤ective when the citizens are participating
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only if, there is absence of elements of stature environmental damage.6
Furthermore, a recent paper in a similar spirit emanates from Rousse
(2008). This paper is di¤using the idea of the citizensparticipation in the
ETS in order to purchase and withdraw permits which induces emissions
reduction. A public institution or a non-governmental organization could be
the broker which can performs the citizenspurchase. However the content
of this paper does not include a technical approach on the citizensparticipa-
tion in the ETS, also, the author does not analyze (technically) the inuence
on the rmstechnological choice which emanates from the reduction of the
permitsquantity. But we must note two important things: a) This paper
distinguishes the advantages of the direct participation in the ETS in relation
to the carbon-o¤sets; b) The paper leaves a taste of the technological inno-
vation. Specically, the author proposes that a high increase in the permits
price - emanates from the citizensparticipation - could stimulate innovation.
Finally, in the previous year, Eshel and Sexton (2009), argue that the
direct participation of the community in the permitsmarket may contribute
to the environmental quality and reveal the communitys preferences for the
level of pollution. In their model, the community participates in an imper-
fectly competitive permitsmarket under the presence of one dominant rm
which can a¤ect the price of the permits (market power) but it is a price
taker in the output market. Also they assume that the rest of the rms are
price takers to both markets, permits and output, where the community is a
price taker in the permitsmarket. Furthermore, they analyse two cases; In
the rst case the community can purchase permits only through the permits
market. In the second case, the regulator will allocate initial permits (free
of charge - grandfathered system) to the rms as well as to the community.
Thus, the community can purchase and /or can sell permits to the rms
6The pollutions damage is common knowledge but the rms abatement cost is private.
The regulator asks the rms about their abatement cost. By Kwerels assumptions the
rms have higher benet telling the truth. The government (regulator) does not grandfa-
ther the permits.
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through to the permitsmarket. The authors conclude that the participation
of the community to the permitsmarket could have ambiguous inuence
(increasing or decreasing) to the e¢ ciency of the tradable permitssystem
and it depends on the position of the dominant rm in the permitsmar-
ket. Simply, it depends if the dominant rm is a net seller or a net buyer of
permits.
Environmental groupsstrategy and tradable
permits
As we know from the legal documents, everyone can participate in the ETS,
even the victims. The victims could be some interests groups or individ-
ual persons who are a¤ected by the rmsemissions and are trying to react
against the pollution. We will focus on a specic interest group with high
sensitivity to environmental protection; the environmental groups. Charac-
teristic of the environmental groups are, the methods which they use in their
strategy: activism and lobbying.7 From the late 80s decade, environmental
groups had participated in the USAs permits market in order to withdraw
a number of allowances from the market as a way to reduce pollution. Then
the environmental groupsacquired another new method for environmental
protection. This new strategy is clear from the homepage of Acid Rain Re-
tirement Fund (ARRF, 1997) :8
«As we retire more allowances, the price will go up. Polluting companies
will need to bid larger amounts of money to continue polluting. As the price
of polluting goes up, companies will be more inclined to invest money in
7For an idea on the transnational environmental activist groups in the international
politic arena, with examples on activism, see Wapner (1995). The reader could nd more
informations for the environmental groupsactions, tools, motivations and strategy in the
second chapter.
8The ARRF is one of the leading environmental groups in USA. The source of this
information emanates from Carman (2002).
20
technologies that remove pollution before it reaches the smokestack»
Permits in the environmentalistshands confer the right not to accept
more pollution emissions from rms and a democratic reaction like this is
possible only by the victimsfree participation in the permitsmarket with-
out restrictions. This opinion is conrmed by Kruger and Dean (1997) who
argue that the environmentalists participation in the ETS by an ethics
viewpoint lends a democratic character to the permitssystem. Hence the
environmental groups independent of the type of distribution system (auc-
tioned or grandfathered) selected by the government, could purchase and
withdraw permits (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002). Gorman and Solomon
(2002) and Hahn and Stavins (1991) describe the environmentalistsreaction
to the emissions tradable permitsapplication in USA. They argue that the
ecologists had been opposed to the early applications of EPA emissions trad-
ing program (in 70s and 80s) but later become major proponents of tradable
permits since the control of acid rain (later 80s).9 In addition, Tietenberg
(1990) points out that some environmental groups (organizations) have in
their strategy for environmental protection, economic incentive approaches.
Initially, the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS took place in
USA almost from the rst applications of the tradable permits. Currently
the British Non Governmental Organisation Sandbag collects charitable do-
nations in order to purchase and withdrawn permits from the European Emis-
sion Trading System. From the historic applications of the tradable permtis
in USA we have some elements which could explain; the environmentalists
targets or the reasons for this participation as well as their e¤ects in the
permitssystem and market. These elements are presented in the continuing
of the paper but rstly we explain why the environmentalists prefer the trad-
able permits as a better way (than other choices) in order to achieve their
aims.
9EPA: Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.A.
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Why the environmentalists prefer the tradable
permits?
The environmentalists prefer the permits market to the taxes because the
level of desirable emissions reduction is explicit (Stavins 1998) and the level
of the environmental protection that will be achieved is specied (Hahn and
Stavins, 1991). Moreover, according to Carman (2002), the free participation
in the tradable permits markets could directly a¤ect the policy outcomes and
create a new way of public activism and reaction for groups which care for
the environmental quality. Furthermore, the success of the interest groups
lobbying is more uncertain in relation to the tradable permits. In a further
analysis about the interest groups preferences on tradable permits, Svend-
sen (1999) ascertains that, from the environmentalistsviewpoint, the free
permits sharing based on the historical emissions (grandfathered), makes
the decrease of high level emissions from the industry more possible. More-
over, the environmentalists trust the grandfathered system because it pro-
vides higher degrees of insurance against the cases of rms cheating. The
grandfather system is an automatic monitoring system. The regulator or an
authority is monitoring the rms emissions and enforces a penalty if in the
end of a specic period the rm has more emissions than permits.
Environmentalistsparticipation in tradable per-
mitsmarket
From the earlier applications on tradable permits in USA, we have some re-
ports about the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS. The ecological
groupsparticipation started in the US almost two decades before. Some
examples are: Clean Air Conservancy Trust, Acid Rain Retirement Fund,
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Adirondack Council and Environmental Resources Trust.10 These groups
use to purchase and withdraw emissions permits in order to reduce the level
of the maximum emissions in the atmosphere. In the literature, some empir-
ical papers conrm and analyze the third partiesparticipation in the USs
tradable permits markets.
Israel D. (2007) examines the thirds partiesparticipation (but mainly
the environmental groups) in the sulfur emissions trading program between
the years 1993 and 2006. She concludes that the number of the withdrawn
permits is not too high relatively to the total number of available permits
in the market. This fact indicates that; on the one hand the regulator had
uncertainty about the social optimal level of emissions but, on the other
hand, the regulator had targets near to the social optimal. Joskow et al.
(1998), through an empirical analysis on the auction of tradable emissions
(SO2) in 90s, had focused on the buyersbehaviours and they argued that;
the third parties (ecological groups, law schools, etc) used to o¤er very high
prices for the permits acquisition. The possible explanations for this behav-
ior, according to the authors are: a) the non awareness about the markets
function; b) the certainty of the permits property or; c) the buyers appreci-
ated that it was plausible for some reason to o¤er high prices. Schwarze and
Zapfel (2000) compared the design of two di¤erent anti-pollution programs
(SAT and RECLAIM) in which the third partiesparticipation in permits
market conrmed the political acceptability and the public correspondence
for environmental improvement.11 Frank (2001) presents the di¢ culties of
the tradable permitsapplication but also stands on the systems benets
where he includes the permits ownership by the environmental organiza-
tions. Tietenberg (2003) in the experience analysis of the tradable permits
10For more information: http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/traiding/buying.html (access
date 27 Nov. 2007).
11Sulfur Allowance Trading Program (SAT) for the decreasing of SO2 and South Cali-
fornian Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) for the decreasing of SOX and
NOX .
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application in air, water and sheries, refers that; the environmental groups
had purchased and withdrawn allowances in acid rain permits market.
Although we have information about the environmental groupspartici-
pation in former applications on tradable permits, there is not an analysis on
the rmstechnological choice given the third playerspresence in the system
and specically by the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS.
As it was above, the environmentalists have one main aim: They want to
minimize the rmsexternalities. So the environmentalists will participate
in the ETS in order to purchase and withdraw permits from the market. Re-
tiring permits decreases the available supply of permits and by the economic
principles (of supply and demand) this action drives prices of permits up.
Then, the rational rmsstrategy is to use a tool which can provide higher
independence from the permits. Therefore, the strategy of the withdrawn
permits, could induce rms to select a greener-technology which reduces the
productivitys negative externalities (by-product result).
In the literature there are many papers which are focusing on the relation
between the anti-pollution policies and the rmstechnological choice. Some
of these papers examine which instrument of environmental policy encourages
the rmstechnological change more, under various conditions. Nevertheless,
there is not an analysis about the relation between the environmentalists, the
tradable permits and the rmstechnological choice. However, the spirit of
some of the below papers is near to the scope of our study.
Technological choice and anti-pollution policy
Among economists, it is argued that the policies for environmental protec-
tion could a¤ect and must a¤ect positively the technological choice following
Orrs (1976) opinion «Technological adaptation rather than resource allo-
cation becomes the key to an e¤ective solution» . The literature on the in-
centives for technological adoption under the umbrella of anti-pollution pol-
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icy instruments is large.12 The environmental policy target can be achieved
at lower costs with technological improvement, where the technological im-
provement can result from rmstechnological innovation, adoption or R&D
investment. Given that Rosenberg (1973) wrote «Todays factor substitu-
tion possibilities are made possible by yesterdays technological innovations»
we consider that the technological innovation (or the technological choice)
describes all the possible technological changes (like adoption, R&D, etc.).13
Hence, the rmstechnological choice could be a result which emanates from
environmental policiesapplications but, in our case, could be accelerated by
the environmentalistsparticipation in ETS. I include some recent empirical
and theoretical papers which show the relation between the policies against
global warming and the connection with the technological change.
Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Goulder and Mathai (2000) examine
the implications of Induced Technological Change (ITC) for CO2 abatement
policy. They present the direct connection between the environmental poli-
cies and the ITC and show that the environmental policy (policy shocks)
for the decreasing of the CO2 emissions could be a motivation for increasing
investment on R&D by the rms.
Chakravorty et al. (1997) present a simulation for the R&D of solar
energy under the presence of the climate change and the cost reduction con-
cluding that it is possible to decrease global temperature in the future by
adopting this renewable energy. In the same spirit, Newell et al. (1999)
analyze how the energy prices and the governments regulations can a¤ect
technological change. Also, Popp (2002) found a direct and positive impact
of energy prices and the quality of knowledge on the induced innovation
hypothesis.
12For a total survey in the literature of the technological change see: Löschel (2002),
Requate (2005), van Soest (2005), Clarke et al. (2006), Wing (2006).
13The technological changes emanate from the environmental policies. These techno-
logical changes can be a result from: R&D or Induced Innovation Hypothesis, technology
adoption or advanced abatement technology adoption from the market and induced tech-
nological change.
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Requate (1998), Fischer et al. (2003) and Requate and Unold (2003)
compared the propensity to technological innovation and adoption induced
by several market-based instruments (emissions taxes, free permits and auc-
tioned permits) under di¤erent scenarios. Furthermore, Kerr and Newell
(2003) examined the repercussions of regulatory and economic variables on
the technological adoption for the case of U.S. reneries. Their results con-
rm that the tradable permits system provides more e¢ cient incentives for
technology adoption than does taxes. More specically, the link between
the tradable permits and the technology adoption is examined by Kennedy
(1999). Kennedy argues that the permitsquantity a¤ects the technology
adoption. In his two periodsmodel, the regulator has uncertainty about the
environmental damages and the author examined the incentives for cleaner
technology adoption by the rms under di¤erent quantities of permitssup-
plied by the regulator. According to the author the permits can induce
technological change (e¢ cient technology adoption) even when the regulator
has asymmetric information.
Later, the idea of the restrictions on the tradable permitsquantity had
been analyzed by a macroeconomic simulation model (RICE) by Buonanno
et al. (2001) and by Matschoss and Welsch (2006). In these two articles the
authors examine how the di¤erent quantities of permits that are marketable
between countries can a¤ect the level of the countriesR&D under the Kyoto
protocol. Consequently, the change in the permitsquantity that is available
in the market changes the level of R&D and accordingly the technological
choice. Based on the same model, Buonanno et al (2003) examine the in-
ternational permits trade and the technological change in di¤erent scenarios
concluding that; the cost for the Kyoto targets is lower insofar the ETS ex-
ists. In our paper rms substitute the countries and the environmentalists
create the restrictions as a result of the permits withdrawn.
The above papers conrm that the market based economics instruments
(taxes and permits) for the anti-pollution policy could not only reduce the
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emissions but could also encourage the adoption of new and better technolo-
gies. Following the above approaches, we examine the case in which a third
player, the environmental group, functions as a lever of pressure to the rms
for the acceleration of the technological choice and reduction of emissions.
Technological choice, emissions and trade unions
Apart from the environmental groups, another group or coalition that has the
power to inuence the rms technological choice is the trade union. Through
the bargaining process between the union and the rm, the decisions on the
technology could be inuenced indirectly. Therefore, any technological choice
with respect to the environmental issue could be a¤ected by the rm-union
bargaining. Thus, this is another case of the third parties inuence on the
rms technology and as a result on the level of the emissions. The case
of the unions inuence on the rmstechnological choice has been analysed
extensively in the literature but their inuence on the level of emissions has
been neglected.
Trade unions and environmental issue
It is not surprising that the unions have incentives within the environmental
issue. The history of the trade unions in US and Europe includes cases of
trade unions with samples of environmentalism. For example the Team-
ster Unions environmental concern emerges from the speech of the president
Jimmy Ho¤a, "This is going throughout the world to oppressed people every-
where, that we care, that we are going to change WTO or we are going to get
rid of WTO. We come with a message to stop what you are doing, stop the
mindless trade deals, stop the oppression of workers throughout the world,
stop the rape of the environment." (Rose, 2004, page 3.).
The common interests of the unions and the green groups drive them to
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create alliances (Blue-Green Alliance) against the dirtyrms, where the
improvement of the rmsproduction methods with regards to the environ-
mental issues (e.g. toxic waste) reduces the risks to the workers health
during their work and decreases the environmental damage (see for example
Rose, 2004 and Obach, 2002). However, this is only one side of the coin given
that there are evidences on the reaction by the organised workers against en-
vironmental policies which could reduce levels of employment. For example,
in USA, the allowance trading system for the reduction of the SO2 could
encourage the production of low-sulfur coal from the less labor-intensive and
non-unionised mines. However, the United Mine Workers in order to protect
the jobs in the mines with the higher-sulfur coal, antagonised the specic
environmental tool (Stavins, 1998).
In the same framework, Fredriksson and Gaston (1999), investigate the
case where the union lobbying the government in order to inuence the sever-
ity of the environmental policy (taxes). The authors point out that, a union
with homogeneous unionised members, which care for the level of members
employment and wages, will lobby the government in order to relax the strin-
gency of the environmental policy. Additionally, if there is discrimination
between inside (unionised) and outside workers (non-unionised) the union
may prefer to lobby for a tighter greenpolicy which discourages the level
of employment for the outsiders and increases the level of inside employees
wages.
Trade unions and innovation
An essential issue in regards to the trade union is the inuence they may
have on the rmsstrategy and specically on the rmstechnological choice;
whether the unionisation a¤ects the rmsincentives to innovate. In the last
years, an increasing literature, has deal with this role of the union on in-
novation but both the theoretical and the empirical studies have ambiguous
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results. For example, there is a positive relation between the unions and the
R&D investment in Europe but negative in North America (Menezes-Filho
and Van Reenen 2003). Later in this study, a number of some key theoret-
ical papers on trade union and innovation are reviewed with the analogous
contributions in the literature.
Tauman and Weiss (1987) examine the role of unionization on the adop-
tion of labor-saving technology in an oligopolist market. Specically, they
assume a Cournot market with two rms, one unionised and the second non-
unionised, under a two stage game. In the initial stage, the technologies are
chosen simultaneously or sequentially and the wages follow technology. In the
second stage the rms choose output. The model is based on a tournament
approach where the two rms participate in a race for the best technological
adoption, so in the end only one rm becomes innovator. They show that
it is possible for the unionised rm to adopt the new labor-saving technol-
ogy. Actually, the unionised rm has more incentives to adopt the improved
labor-saving technology because the higher costs (wages) from the unionisa-
tion, encourages the rm to adopt advanced labor-saving technology.
In Ulph and Ulph (1989) two rms participate in a race for a new technol-
ogy (tournament model). If one rm discovers, adopts or purchases the new
technology, then it gains the right to be the only user (innovator) of the new
technology. The authors are using a Cournot model with two rms and two
unions, so each rm faces a single separate union with which it negotiates.
There are three stages; in the rst stage the rms participate in the auctions
and each one o¤ers the maximum bid in order to purchase the new technol-
ogy. In the second stage the winner decides when to use the new technology
and in the third stage -given the technology- the rms negotiate with the
unions on the wages and the number of workers (e¢ cient bargaining model).
Furthermore they compare two possible timings for the negotiations with the
unions. The ex-post bargaining at stage 3 and the post-auction bargaining at
stage 2. In the post-auction bargaining, the union can inuence the timing
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of the use (introduction) of the new technology. So, for the rms, the inno-
vation process has two steps, to purchase (or develop) the new technology
and to introduce the technology to the production line. Some general results
are that; the strength of the union (how powerful it is) and the timing of the
negotiations could negatively inuence the rmsincentives for R&D as well
as the timing of the introduction of the new technology.
In 1994, Uph and Ulph analyse only the case of the ex-post bargain
between two rms and two unions. Therefore, the rms negotiate with the
unions over the R&D investment and introduction. In this case, like in the
previous, only the rms compete in both the product market and technology
(tournament) for a new labor-saving technology but the authors compare the
Right-to-Manage (RTM) bargain with the E¢ cient Bargaining case (EB).
They show that under the RTM approach, the more the union cares for the
employment the less the e¤ect they have on the innovation. Also, under the
EB case, the higher the unions bargaining strength, the more the inuence
on the innovation. There are three stages like in the previous paper (Ulph
and Ulph, 1989) and the union is characterised by a risk aversion utility.
Based on the previous papers as well as some other articles Ulph and Ulph
(1998) presented the results from theoretical models under a tournament case
and a Cournot duopoly market. Some of the results are that, in long term,
an increase of the unions power could increase the investment in R&D if the
innovation could increase the level of employment. In a short-term period
and under the case of the RTM, a possible increase of the unions strength
will drive the rm to less innovation (less R&D). Also, under the EB case
there is a U-shape relation between unions bargaining power and R&D when
the union cares a lot for employment.
Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) consider the inuence of the struc-
ture of the union in the adoption of the technology under the case of a homo-
geneous Cournot duopoly market. The authors compare two possible cases;
the decentralised case where each rm deals with its own independent union
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and centralised where there is one union for the two rms (industry-wide
union). The rms have the opportunity to adopt a labour-saving technology
and negotiate with the union(s) according to the Right-to-Manage model.
Also, the authors analyse the cases where: both rmsinnovate; only one in-
novates; or both rms choose to not innovate. The game has three stages; in
the rst, each rm decides simultaneously on the technology and can choose
between two levels of technology, the new or the old technology. In the second
stage each union bargains with its rm simultaneously and in the third, the
rms decide on the output (and employment therefore), simultaneously, too.
They conclude that the union centralisation may provide stronger incentives
to the rms for innovation than decentralisation. However, this argument is
strong under a small market size. Under a high level of market size, the cen-
tralised union makes innovation more di¢ cult than the decentralised union.
Haucap and Wey (2004) focus on three possible models for the inuence
of the unions structure on the rms innovation. They focus on decen-
tralised unions, coordination where the union sets individual wages for all
rms and centralised union, where there is only one wage for all the rms
in the industry. The stages are similar like in the model by Calabuig and
Gonzalez-Maestre and the rms compete in a R&D tournament race. Also,
the technology is labour-saving as usual. They show that the rms in-
centives for investment or innovation are larger under a centralised union.
Additionally, the decentralised case encourages innovation more than the
coordination. Moreover, the decentralisation o¤ers higher levels of employ-
ment to the unions than the coordination and the centralised o¤ers lower
employment levels.
Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) analyse the incentives of the rms to invest
on cost-reducing R&D under di¤erent union structure. They compare the
R&D investment under the case of the R&D spillovers when i) the two rms
do not cooperate in technology and ii) the two rms cooperate under the
form of Research Joint Ventures (RJV). They show that under low spillovers
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and without cooperation, the centralised union (uniform wage) encourages
more R&D investment than the decentralised structure. But, under the case
of the RJV the incentives for R&D investment are always higher under the
decentralisation structure.
The previous papers are based on the two typical ways of bargaining be-
tween the rms and the unions. The Right to Manage model, where the
union sets the wages and the rms decides on the number of workers and the
E¢ cient Bargaining model where rms and unions bargain over the level of
wages and employment. In the rest of the research I present some represen-
tative studies for each bargaining case as well as the di¤erences between the
two approaches.
Trade union-rm bargaining models
There is a wide and increasing literature on the negotiations between the
trade union(s) and the rm(s). Although it is not possible to summarize the
ndings of this large literature we review some results from di¤erent models
and methodologies. Generally, there are two main bargaining models, the
Right to Manage model (RTM) and the E¢ cient Bargaining model (EB).
Right to Manage model
The RTM model is introduced by Nickell and Andews (1983) in an empirical
paper based on the British data of wages and employment. In this model the
rm and the union bargain over wages and the level of employment is set by
the rm unilaterally. However, at this point it is essential to note that an
earlier model, the monopoly union model (Dunlop, 1944) is a special case of
the RTM model. In the monopoly union model the wage is set by the union
and the rms keep the right to manage employment. Furthermore, in the
RTM case the rms and the unions bargain on the levels of wages where the
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level of the bargaining power of the union is important for the outcome of
the wages bargained.
Espinosa and Rhee (1989) analyse the wage bargaining in a repeated game
and they show that e¢ ciency would depend on the discount rate which is
used for the calculation of the present value. Thus, it is possible that in a
dynamic model the two parties (union and rm) could achieve more e¢ cient
solutions in the long term than in the static game.
Lopez and Naylor (2004) focus on the di¤erentiated duopoly market under
a Cournot and a Bertrand market. In their model the upstream suppliers
are the unions and the downstream are the rms where both parties bargain
over wages. Each union negotiates with one rm. They conclude that if the
unions are su¢ ciently powerful, the prots in the Bertrand model are higher
than in the Cournot, otherwise the standard results hold (prots in Cournot
are higher than in Bertrand).
A group of papers study the relation between labor and the rmsdecision
for export or for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or for both. In this case a
rm from one country could build a factory in a second country but may also
prefer to export the same good to the second country. For example Bughin
and Vannini (1995) connect FDI with the unionised oligopoly market under
a RTM model. They study the impact of the trade unions on a foreign rms
incentives to invest in another country. In their model there is a multinational
enterprise (MNE) which can export or invest abroad. Also there are two
cases: a) the MNE and a domestic rm are unionised and; b) only the
domestic rm is unionised. A main result is that under full unionisation
the domestic rm is better when the competitor (MNE) produces abroad
because then, the domestic wage is lower than in the opposite case. In the
same spirit, Mukherjee (2008) focus on the interaction between labor and
rms following the same wage bargaining model. He assumed that there is
a unionized labour market in the foreign country, concluding that under the
unionised market, the foreign rm prefers to use both exports and FDI but
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even then, the nal choice depends on other factors like xed cost of the FDI
and the product market size.
In a di¤erent framework Barcena-Ruiz (2003) explores four di¤erent cases
of the bargaining structures between two rms and two unions. Specically,
the author based on a Cournot duopoly analyses the: a) decentralised and
simultaneous; b) decentralised and sequential; c) centralised and simulta-
neous and; d) centralised and sequential bargaining. The model has two
stages where in the rst stage, wages are negotiated (for each case) and in
the second, the rms choose the output. He concludes that when the ne-
gotiations are decentralized, unions prefer sequential bargaining, while in
the centralised case, unions prefer simultaneous bargaining. However, the
governments preferences depend on the proportion of the shares that the
domestic shareholders own in rms.
E¢ cient Bargaining Model
McDonald and Solow (1981) examine the E¢ cient Bargaining model where
the rm and the union negotiate on the level of wages and employment
simultaneously. The outcome from the bargain could lead to a solution for
the union and the rm where nobody could become better without making
the other worst o¤.
A di¤erent approach on the e¢ cient bargaining model emanates from
Manning (1987) who connected the RTM with the EB model. Specically,
the author focus on the case where the unions negotiate with the rm both
on wages and employment as a sequential game. However, the union has
di¤erent bargaining power for each level of negotiation. Initially, in the rst
stage, the union bargains with the rm on the level of wages with a specic
level of bargain power, then in the second stage the union negotiates with
the rm for the number of workers but with a di¤erent bargaining power.
More recently, Vannini and Bughin (2000) compare the RTM with the EB
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model under a di¤erentiated Cournot market. Besides, the authors compare
two structures of bargaining cases; the centralised against the decentralised.
In the rst case, there is only one trade union on the market which negoti-
ates with the two rms (centralised structure). In the second case there are
two trade unions in the market, one for each rm (decentralised structure).
Also there are two stages; in the rst stage, the rms choose simultaneously
whether or not to accept bargaining with the unions (according to the prof-
itability of each strategy). So, the rms will decide if they will recognize the
unions and then automatically will bargain with these. In the second stage
the rms bargain with the union(s) for wages or/and employment (depend-
ing on the bargain model, RTM or EB). The main results are; the rms will
accept bargaining with the union as a way to increase their market power
(or to increase the level of the rmsoutput). So, the rms will adopt a
cost raising strategy (they will recognize the union, therefore, they will pay
higher wages to the unionised workers) only under the case of the EB model
if the unions have low level of union power and there is a low level of product
di¤erentiation). Moreover, the rms will not accept unionisation if the bar-
gaining process is based on the RTM approach. Thus even if the unionised
labour cost is higher for the rms than the non-unionised, the rms prefer
the centralised union because the protability for the rms is higher (more
market power or bigger level of output).
In another case Bughin (1999) compares the RTM with the EB case in
a standard Cournot model and under possible market entry. In this case
there is only one trade union (centralised) and the time of the game is as
follows; the incumbent rm decides on the bargaining agenda (RTM or EB),
then the potential entrant rm decides if it will enter or not. Finally, the
rm(s) negotiate with the union for wages and/or workers (EB or RTM)
and output. The author concludes that the EB model can dominate the
RTM in the unionised Cournot duopoly and furthermore, under the threat
of entry, the incumbent rm prefers the e¢ cient bargaining model if the
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union is characterised by a su¢ ciently low union power because this could
be an entry deterrence mechanism.
Di¤erences between RTM and EB models
In the case of the RTM model, the union(s) and the rm(s) will only bargain
over the wages. Then, the union sets the wages and the rm has the right
to decide on the level of employment. Thus, the two parts negotiate on the
labour demand curve and this is Pareto-ine¢ cient because it is possible that
the union, the rm, or both could be better o¤ by bargaining over employ-
ment and wages (e¢ cient bargaining model). In this case, the negotiation
will take place on the right or North-East of the labour demand curve.
Hence, in the case of the RTM, the union can inuence the wage and
in the EB model the union can inuence the level of the wage and the em-
ployment together. The RTM approach is used mainly in the European
market-oriented countries (Layard et al.,1991). However, for the EB, there is
evidence that the rms and the unions usually do not bargain simultaneously
over wages and employment (Booth, 1995).
Also, in the RTM case, any increases of the level of wages will drive the
rm to reduce the demand for employment because the bargain lies on the
labour demand curve. However, in the EB case, it is possible to avoid this
trade o¤ between wages and employment (Nickel and Andrews, 1983).
Conclusion
The rest of the analysis is separated in the exploration of the two coalitions
(environmental groups and trade unions) with respect to their reaction on the
rmslevel of pollution and as a result, on their inuence on the rmstech-
nological choice. The second chapter of the research focus on environmental
groupsstrategy, motivations and decision in order to drive the reader deeper
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in the core of the groups decisions and to spill more light on the function
and their objectives. The third chapter connects the environmental groups
with the emissions tradable permits market when the environmentalists can
participate in the permits market in order to purchase and withdrawn per-
mits. The motivation for the specic research emanates from the real world
experience where environmental groups used to purchase emissions permits
in order to press the rms to adopt a greener, less polluting, technology. This
case is represented in the third chapter under a theoretical model. Finally,
the fourth chapter includes the case of the trade unions reaction against to
the rms emissions (which is a by-product result) and it is also a case which
originates from the real life. Therefore, the fourth chapter explore two pos-
sible cases of trade unions structures, the decentralised and the centralised,
in order to compare the results and specically, when the emissionslevel is
lower.
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CHAPTER 2
Environmental groups as rational players: An
analysis on the greengroups and the
membersmotivations1
1 Introduction
A substantial amount of analysis has been performed on environmental groups
behavior in the economic and political science literature. An early approach
on the crucial role of the groups role emanates from Truman (1951), but
the development of the literature on groups starts from Olsons (1965) book.
I distinguish between two main categories of groups: for prot groups (e.g.
Industrial groups) and non for prot groups (e.g. Environmental groups).
I focus on the non prot groups and specically on environmental groups,
which here will be referred to as Environmental Non Governmental Organi-
zations (ENGOs). The environmental groups are part of a larger category
known as interests groups (Svendsen, 1999; Walker, 1983; Moe, 1980) as well
as pressure groups (Becker, 1983; Rawcli¤e, 1998; Castles, 1967).
Historically the environmental groups characterize the new era of a so-
cial movement for the protection of the environment (Dunlap and Mertig,
1992). The activist organizations transfer information to consumers about
the protable companiesmethods (Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001) and the
environmental groups, through the lobbyists, create an important communi-
cation channel which connects the government with the group and the mem-
1An earlier version of this article has been presented in Loughborough University for the
conference Between Scylla and Charybdis: energy security and climate change challenges
in the European Union2009. I am grateful to the audience as well as to Maria Jose Gil-
Molto, Tulio Cravo, Nikolaos Georgantzis and TomWeyman - Jones for helpful suggestions
and comments on early drafts of this paper.
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bers (Ainsworth and Sened, 1993).2 Hence, the presence and longevity of
the ENGOs are very important for the quality of the social and political life.
Since the beginning of the environmental movement until today new elements
have characterised the ENGOsstrategies. As Bosso (2003), states «these
organizations have simply adapted themselves to their external conditions -
including the scope and potency of their opposition- in order to survive and
ght another day» . Following on from Bossos statement this study presents
some external conditions which inuence the environmentalistscontempo-
rary strategy and decisions. I focus on the environmental groupsbehaviour
and specically on their motivations. Furthermore, I analyse the members
obvious and non-obvious objectives and how these could be connected with
or inuence the groups aims. Besides, the similarities between a nonprot
rm and a nonprot environmental group allow for a connection to be made
between the two approaches (nonprot rms and non for prot groups) si-
multaneously with a deeper analysis on the ENGOs motivations and targets
which, at some point, di¤er from the non prot rmsaims.
It is generally accepted that a central feature in environmental groups
action is altruism. Environmentalists are trying to protect the atmosphere,
the quality of the water (sea, lakes and rivers), the forests, biodiversity (in
the sea and on the land), etc. In the economic literature this behavior is
known as altruistic. A group of people are willing to sacrice something
(time, money, e¤ort, etc.) for the improvement of the public welfare. In the
case of the environmental protection all the citizens gain from the benets
of a better environmental quality even if only the environmentalists ght
for this case. However, according to Baron (2003, p.50) the activists may
have more than the obvious targets: «Some activists may have as their
objective protecting the environment and securing human rights. They may
2In Ainsworth and Sened (1993), the lobbyists are the persons who watch the policy-
makers meetings, decisions and the legislative tendencies (in Congress or Parliament) and
they inform the NGOs in order to transfer the groupspreferences or reaction back in the
political authority.
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also want to attract new members and contributions. They may also have the
objective of becoming the leader of a broader movement or simply obtaining
and exercising power» .
From this, a number of questions emerge concerning the behavior and
the motivations of the environmental non prot groups or ENGOs. Speci-
cally: Is the environmental defence the only motivation for the environmental
groups? Are there any other motivations? If yes, are the other motivations
altruistic? How do these motivations a¤ect the environmentalistsbehavior,
priorities, aims and decisions?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the above issues. Within the
scope of this paper is to understand the function, maintenance, strategy and
targets of the environmental non-prot groups as well as the characteristics
of the group managers decisions. It is hypothesised that the answers to
the above questions could characterize the nature of the ENGOsobjectives.
By a fundamental viewpoint, the aim of this study is to revisit and enrich
the existing theory for the ENGOs as well as for the groups behavior in
collective issues. Furthermore, in order to present an overall picture of the
groups and members behavior I collect, connect and report studies from
di¤erent sciences like political sciences, behavioral sciences and sociology
with interdisciplinary characteristics.
In the next section the environmental groups and membersmotivations
are analysed. In the section 3 the role of the impure altruism on the members
e¤ort for the environmental protection under a lobby activity and the relation
with the free riding issue is explored. A discussion follows in section 4 and
nally, conclusions are in section 5.
2 Environmental groups motivations
In recent years the realization of the ENGOsbattles take place in a variety
of fronts with di¤erent competitors. An increasing and important part of
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the literature focus on the groupslobby for political inuence. For exam-
ple, Becker (1983), noted that «Groups compete for political inuence by
spending time, energy, and money on the production of political pressure» .
Environmental groups are trying to press the government in order to inuence
the political decisions relatively with the environmental issues. Theoretical
and empirical models analyze the environmentalistsstrategy like the lobby
to the regulator (e.g. Fredriksson et. al, 2007) or the political contribution
to the policy makers (see Riddel, 2003) as well as, the competition between
the environmentalists and the industrialists for political inuence in various
situations (for instance Becker, 1983 and Yu, 2005).3 Another part of the
literature is concentrated on ENGOspossible strategic tools; in Heijnen and
Schoonbeek (2008), an environmental group can use a campaign in order to
shift the consumerspreferences against a specic goods production which is
responsible for negative externalities. Conversely, in Innes (2006), an environ-
mental organization threatens the rms with a boycott in order to promote
the greenproduction techniques against the brownproduction practice.
Also Baron (2003), and Baron and Diermeier (2007), study a contemporary
activist campaign in the framework of private politics. Recently, in the same
spirit, Lyon and Maxwell (2008), analyse the role of the Non Governmental
Organisations on the adoption of environmental Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (CSR) by the rms. Meanwhile, cases for the public education and
information campaigns from the environmental groups reported in Mitchell
et al. (1992), and moreover Wapner (1995), analyze the power of the orga-
nized activism across to the Transnational Environmental Activist Groups
(TEAGs).
Although the above approaches are very signicant for the analysis of
the green lobby still they are only a partial approach to ENGOsstrategies.
The Environmental nonprot NGOs not only cooperate4, against the same
3For further analysis see also Cropper et al., 1992; Fredriksson, 1997; Graichen et al.,
2001; Johal and Ulph, 2002; Conconi, 2003; and Fredriksson, et al., 2005.
4For some examples of co-operation between environmental groups see Rawcli¤e (1998,
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enemy, but also compete with one other.
Recently, Bernauer and Cadu¤ (2004), wrote that «...interest groups nd
themselves in an informational competitionwith one another. Each interest
group is trying to convince policy-makers that its favoured policy is benecial
or at least not politically damaging to them...» . Moreover, Tuckman (1998),
states that the competition among the non-prot community is depending
on a variety of possible expectations. Some of these are: the board members
and the volunteers, grants and revenues, donations, gifts and bequests, po-
litical power, quality of service, reputation and prestige. Hewitt and Brown
(2000), in an empirical study for the non prot environmental groups note
that: «Critics claim that the actions of these environmental organizations
are motivated by the pursuit of donations, membership and power, not sim-
ply the provision of services which markets cannot supply» . In addition,
Rawcli¤e (1998, p.25) points out that the external resources for the environ-
mental groups cause the competition among them. Besides, Wapner (1995),
conrms that there are antagonistic relations among di¤erent transnational
activist environmental groups. Finally, in the same spirit Bosso (2003), ar-
gues that policy primacy and attendant resources are the reasons for the
existence of competition between the environmental groups. Therefore, it
is generally acceptable the existence of a competition among groups for a
variety of objectives.
An ENGO has a plethora of activities related to environmental protection
because there is an assortment of sources which cause negative externalities.
Hence, the ENGOs are trying to deal with the problem, using a variety of
tools like: advertising on TV in order to inform the public or to make them
feel guilty for their consumption preferences (van der Made and Schoonbeek,
2008), public education and information for an e¤ective boycott against the
p.24.) and for the option of merge between environmental groups see Heyes and Liston-
Heyes (2005). Also, for the case study of alliances and strategic collaborations between
ENGOs and rms see Sta¤ord et al. (2000)
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non-green products, direct activism, lobbying to the government, etc.5 In
order to carry out these actions the environmental group needs members and
activists (human resources) and nancial support (for the organization of
public education and information, tools, experts, advertising, etc.). Specif-
ically, as Lees-Marshment (2003) refers «Charities or interest groups need
to attract supporters, who o¤er both nancial support and participation, to
achieve their overall goal of inuencing public a¤airs» . However, according
to Bernauer and Cadu¤ (2004), a NGO which has knowledge for its Col-
lective Action Problem could have a rational strategy for the maximization
of the budget, the public support, the membershipsmobilization and the
fundraising. Hence, in this case the NGO has rational behavior similar to
the for prot organizations.
2.1 Groups size and members
One of the main targets for an ENGO is the attraction of more members. The
members and the public support could determine the success of the environ-
mentalism (Dunlap, 1992). Furthermore, the public trust about the ENGOs
is very important for the political arena and for the market, (Bernauer and
Cadu¤, 2004). In this case the success of the ENGO depends on the level of
the direct or indirect social participation.6 The indirect membership chooses
to be activated outside from the rst line of the battle and belongs to the
wave of the public support. In opposition, in the direct social participation
the members are more active in the competition with the enemies.7 Hence
5Regarding the activities of the environmental groups (ENGOs), see Binder and Neu-
mayer (2005).
6For simplicity I assume that the social participation, direct or indirect, includes only
the registered members in the ENGO and not the non-registered public support. Then,
the members will participate in the groups decisions and activities if they will register in
the ENGO. The registration is accompanied by the annual nancial contribution. In this
case this is a common characteristic between the groups and the clubs. For instance see
Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1997).
7An example with two categories of members is included in Lees-Marshment (2003).
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the public support is, probably, the most important factor/resource for the
existence and the function of the environmental group.
On the one hand, Steel et al. (1996), argue that the size of the group could
be an advantage for specic elds (letter-writing, public demonstrations and
volunteers to carry out activities). The members of a group except from the
economic support (for example: annual contributions from the members)
constitute an army of volunteers and activists. They are necessary for the
realization of the groups activities. How the ENGO will benet from the
members depends on the group-managers decisions or from the ENGOs
strategy. According to Fredriksson (1997), the larger is the size of a group
the stronger is the pressure on the government for tighter environmental
policy. Similar, there is a negative relation between the groups size and the
level of the emissions by the rm (Maxwell et al. 2000). Thus, the number
of the members could be a crucial tool in the environmentalists arsenal.
Equally, the members could be candidate voters or supporters of a specic
political campaign which emanates from a greencandidate politician. The
environmentalists under the form of the political action committees (PAC)
support and contribute the legislators or the policy-makers with nancial
contribution and with human potential - e.g. voters and supporters of the
campaign of a specic political part (Riddel, 2003) - so, the interest group
PACs have a rational behavior (Stratmann, 1992).
On the other hand, the members could be the activists outside a unit
of nuclear power or the crew in a boat which opposes itself to the hunting
of whales. Moreover, given the positive relation between the size of the
group and the boardsmembers, the ENGO could make more sonorous its
external participation in the international meetings such as the environmental
negotiations and international agreements (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Biosafety
Protocol and the Protocol of Montreal).8
8Usually the environmental groups are absent from the o¢ cial process of the internal
negotiations. However the ENGOs can inuence indirectly the international environmental
agreement. For instance see Arts and Mack (2003). Also in Gough and Shackley (2001),
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For the provision of the public good there are two theoretical poles in the
literature about the signicant role of the groups size. From Olsons (1965)
classic study emanates the Olson Conjecture, according to which small groups
are more e¤ective in the provision of the public good as opposed to large
groups which su¤er from the Collective Action Problem (CAP). Specically,
in large groups with homogeneous members, the individuals participation in
a collective action has very low inuence on the groups outcome which dis-
courages their participation, because it is rational for them to be free riders
considering the cost of their participation, and this creates the CAP. Thus,
the free riders receive the same benets with the other members of the group
but without any charge. However, the Olson Conjecture is not a panacea
given that it is possible to have a positive relation between the size of the
group and the provision of the public good, under various situations and dif-
ferent assumptions (for example see: Haag and Laguno¤, 2007; Chamberlin,
1974; Esteban and Ray, 2001; Pecorino, 2009).
2.1.1 Why does the public participate in ENGOs?
In Bernauer and Cadu¤ (2004), a NGO group which defends itself against
a public problem reinforces the groups reputation and credibility because it
ghts for public welfare. These benets could increase the public trust for the
group because it is trustworthy and therefore the group attracts more mem-
bers. In this point, it is necessary to note that ENGOs can counterbalance a
governmental di¢ culty to satisfy the citizenspreferences on the environmen-
tal issue. From the citizenspoint of view there is a variety of reasons, which
explain the tendency of the public to participate in an ENGO. I present two
main categories of members according to the groups point of view and two
subcategories according to the membersmotivations for participation. The
two main categories are constituted
NGOs and ENGOs participate in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
and in epistemic community for the climate change.
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i) from the members who participate in the group but the group has no
cost for them, I use the term free-membershereafter
ii) from the members who participate in the group but the group has a
cost for them. Actually, these membersparticipation emanates from the
groups e¤ort to increase the size of the membership. Advertisement, letters
and emails are some tools which could instigate the rise of the membership.
In this case the group must sacrice a part of the resources (money, human
potential, time) in order to gain more members. That is, a part of the
membership in the ENGO is a result of a costly e¤ort. From this point
onwards, I will use the term costly-members in order to refer to these
members.
In both categories the members could have the same spectrum of motiva-
tions for participation in the ENGO, independently from the groups e¤ort
for the increasing of the size. Thus, the two subcategories are based on the
potential membersmotivations and are distinguished between the non-selsh
and the selsh category of motivation.
a) Non-selsh category;
The most ordinary reasons for public participation in a group are the com-
mon preferences, ideas and targets with those of the group. In other words,
an important part of the membership characterised by collective motivations
and collective sensitivity for the environmental quality and quantity. Besides,
the members could have a disutility from the negative externalities, like in the
case of the grassroots groups (Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1992) and they
expect some direct benets from their participation in the groups activities.
Then the environmental group is standing as a part of the society which
reacts against a common disutility situation. For the same category of mem-
bers, the analysis of non prot rms and consumer theory applies. Hence,
given the existence of similar characteristics between non-prot rms and
non prot groups, I use the theory on consumerpreferences for non-prot
rms. Specically, according to West (1989), individual members prefer a
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non-prot organization which they can trust, and the nonprot structure
satises this preference. Additionally, individuals believe that the non-prot
target is a guarantee for the members against possible negative character-
istics of for-protorganizations (groups or rms). So, these members are
volunteers and the group will not incur any cost for the specic members
participation in the group.
b) Selsh category;
Nevertheless, a part of the groups members (or the potential members)
belongs to another subcategory of membership. In this case the participants
have motivations for participation di¤erent than the rst subcategory. Main
characteristics of these members are the self interest motivations which drive
them to participate in an ENGO.9 That is, part of the total membership
in the group has participated taking into consideration their personal ben-
et (except from the environmental protection). The motivations of these
members have a common root which is the personal or the selsh utility.
Figure 1: Categories and subcategories of members.
No selfish
Free
Costly
Members
No selfish
Selfish
Selfish
However, each motivation seperately characterises the behavior of each
selsh - member particularly. In the economic literature, these members are
9In Young (1983, Chapter 5) there is an analysis on the literature review for the eco-
nomic and non-economic motivation of the membersparticipation in voluntary organiza-
tions. Also for rational selsh membersmotivation and/or the relation with the social
norms see Ostrom (2000).
47
known with the term; rationalists. I analyse three cases of memberships
selsh motivations according to the rational characteristic:
1) Selsh Economic Behavior;
Specically for the rst characteristic of the membership in the green
lobby, Smith (1985), argues that the support from private actions and mem-
bership in environmental lobbies could be a result of a rational economic
behavior. Then if the members of a group have rational economic motiva-
tions, then it is possible that some targets of the group will cover not only
the needs for a public good but also individualsexpectations.
2) Selsh Social Behavior;
The selsh social behavior is related with the membersposition in the
society. The members participate in the ENGO with the expectation that
they will gain respect, social status and prestige from their community.10 A
necessary condition is that the public or the other members in the group can
observe this behavior. Hence, the members could participate in the ENGO
in order to improve their self-image.11
3) Selsh Personal Satisfaction;
The memberspersonal psychological satisfaction is the happiness and
the satisfaction that members receive when they believe that they did what
is right and fair. In the economic literature this behavior is known as the
warm glow feeling (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) or with the term joy of giving
from Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), and Abel and Warshawsky (1988). In our
case the warm glow feeling or the joy of giving emanates from the members
action for environmental protection, the provision of the public good and the
increase of social welfare.
Hence the environmental groups have a number of members which are
free and they participate in the ENGO without any cost for the group (free-
10According to the literature (e.g. RoseAckerman, 1996) status, prestige and analogous
characteristics are some of the motivations for the donors (contributors) nancial support.
However the same motivations could apply on the membersbehavior too.
11For instance see Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006).
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members or members without cost for the group). Also another part of the
total members enforce the groups size but the environmental organization
has already incurred a cost to attract them (costly-members). The members
participate in order to provide the public good or/and their personal gains
like the economic gain, the social gain and the personal satisfaction. Further-
more, the size of the membership is a very crucial motivation and target for
the environmental groups. Besides, as it is described to the next paragraph,
the size of the membership is strongly connected with the groups motivation
for budget maximization.
2.2 Environmental groupsbudget
A number of studies recognize the strong competition for philanthropic nan-
cial support in the nonprot sector and a lot of methods have been proposed
to the managers for e¢ cient fundraising e¤orts, (e.g. Eldes, 2006). Walker
(1983) note that the nancial assistance is crucial for the groups in order to
complete their operations. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (2008), recognizes that
« It appears that these groups must attract local private funds if they are
to survive into the future as strong voices for environmental causes» . Thus,
public and private donations are very signicant for the maintenance and the
realization of non for prot organizationsactions. Besides, the size of the
budget of an ENGO positive a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of the boycott against
dirtyrms (Innes, 2006) and it is very crucial for the political inuence
through the PACscontributions.12
The responsibility for a nonprot groups revenue belongs to the groups
managers-leaders. The interest groupsleaders (of which the environmental
group is a part of) have a very serious and important role for the maintenance,
performance and existence of a group because they have the responsibility
to attract funds outside that raised from the membership (Walker, 1983).
12For an extensive analysis on the PACs and on the analogous literature review see
Potters and Sloof (1996).
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In the same spirit for the nonprot groups competition for philanthropic
donations, Rose-Ackerman (1982), focus on the managerscrucial decision
for the fund-raising and the attraction of more donations. Recently, following
the same idea, Thornton (2006), pointed out that, in the competition among
the nonprot for donations, the nonprot managers must compare fund-
raising costs with the analogous level of the income from charitable gifts.
The managers should nd the balance between the cost and benets of the
funds in order for the non prot group to be sustainable. This is a rational
behavior and at least in this point- the managers of prot and nonprot
organisations have similar aims. The managers of the group will use the
resources (advertising, tele-marathons and media, letters, emails, etc.) only
if the gains are worth the fundraising cost.
The ENGOs compete for private funds as well as for grants from govern-
ments or country unions like the E.U. For example Biliouri (1999), in her
paper for the ENGOs in Brussels states that the groups compete with each
other in order to receive nancial support from the EU for projects. Further-
more Walker (1983) points out that a part of the groupstotal budget em-
anates from the government, which is essential for the groupsmaintenance.
However there is a basic requirement by the government to the groups in or-
der to receive the nancial support, specically «70% of the groups reporting
support from the government received it solely for maintenance of their op-
erations, only after they were successfully launched and had established a
record of performance» . Moreover according to Weisbrod and Dominguez
(1986), an e¢ cient non prot organization - with successes in its potential
and with a record of performance attracts a higher level of contributions
from the individual donors. An environmental group tries to provide a public
good but an e¢ cient e¤ort for this attracts more grants from the government
and more donations from individualdonors.13 However, (as I mentioned in
13In this case I assume that the funds from the government and the charitable contri-
bution from the individuals are two complementary sources of income from the groups
viewpoint. Consequently the crowding-out e¤ect is absent. For cases of public and private
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the previous subsection on members and social support) an ENGO needs
members (activists) for the success of its activities in order to consolidate a
record of performance. That is, there is a connection between the size of the
membership and the groups revenues from third parties.
It is also important to note that the members give nancial support to
the groups directly by their contributions but their action helps the group
to establish a record of performance. Then, members, through their action,
can indirectly attract economic support for the group from the government
and individuals.
As a remark I could point out that an ENGO follows a strategy which aims
at not only attracting more members for the provision of the public good but
also annual subscriptions, governments nancial support and individuals
donations through the members e¤ective activities. So the success of an
ENGOs operation could hide more benets than the obvious.
2.2.1 Why do individuals nancially contribute to ENGOs?
Individual contributions are also very important for the ENGOs, especially
in the beginning of the operations or more generally for the rst steps of
the groups e¤orts (Walker, 1983). Why individuals contribute to nonprot
organizations is analyzed in the literature with various explanations. I focus
on two main approaches.
James (1983), explores the factors explaining why people donate to non-
prot organizations. The donors want to monitor the donation in order to
secure that the philanthropy will be well used. The donors trust the nonprot
organizations and feel safer for their contributions because the organizations
derive utility from the positive use of the gift for public welfare. In con-
trast for prot rms will use contributions to increase their prots and the
donations see Posnett and Sandler (1989), and Khanna et al. (1995). Also I assume that
there is no crowding-in e¤ect (Khanna and Sandler, 2000). So, increases of the contribu-
tionsquantity from the government will not necessary increase the level of the individuals
donations.
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government to improve its position by reducing its decit.
However, charities and philanthropic contributions could emanate from
the donorsexpectations and desires. Becker (1974), argues that the dona-
tions are motivated by the donors need for prestige and social acclaim. In the
same spirit Glazer and Konrad (1996), add the social status as a motivation
which positively a¤ects the donations and the contributorsutility. Also the
individualsdesire for reputation could be a motivation which inuences the
donorsphilanthropic behavior (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Furthermore,
the emotional motivation of the personal satisfaction (warm glow feeling)
could be one more motivation of the donors for the nancial contributions
(Andreoni, 1989; 1990).14 An analogous psychological motivation referred to
as the joy of givingis presented in Ribar and Wihelm (2002), and Abel and
Warshawsky (1988). Rose-Ackerman (1996), reports that the giving has the
roots in feelings like «the commitment, sympathy and belief in moral value as
well as prestige, pride and desire for attendance at elite parties if the action
is observable from others» . In the same spirit for the donorsmotivations
Haurbaugh (1998a, b) analyzes the combination of warm glow and the desire
for prestige as a benet for the donor.
The last reason for the contributorsmotivations is very signicant be-
cause these motivations can strongly connect the groupsbehavior with rev-
enue maximization. Specically Romano and Yildirim (2001), support that
if the environmental groups know that the contributors are characterized by
motivations like snob feeling or warm glow feeling then the group can ben-
et from announcing contributions sequentially. Hence the ENGO can take
advantage of the contributorsvanity in order to maximize its revenues.
14In Frey (2008), most donors motivated by the warm glow feeling which they feel when
they become benefactors while their interest for the organisationsactivities is relatively
low.
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2.3 Collective (groups) impure altruism15
So far I have analysed two main motives which a¤ect the strategy of ENGO;
size and budget maximization. Also I show that impure altruism like the
warm glow feeling, joy of giving, prestige, reputation, social status, etc. are
among donors and membersmotivations.16 However these factors could
characterize not only the individualsbehavior but also the ENGOs strategy.
For example, Weiss and Fershtman (1998), note «Social status is a ranking
of individuals (or groups of individuals) in a given society, based on their
traits, assets and actions.» (p. 802).
The environmentalists could make decisions about the groups strategy
following aims which are analogous to their feelings or their expectations.
Generally for the leaders of all organizations, Young (1983), mentions that
they have a spectrum of motivations from the pure self-interest (impure al-
truism or egoism) to pure altruism. Specically, concerning the managers of
the NGOs, James (1982) wrote that «leaders are motivated by a desire to
do good(sometimes with a strong patronizing element built in), to acquire
social prestige and approbation among their peers, and to travel... In a few
cases, a desire to win political inuence is probably also involved» .
Therefore, the above impure altruistic motivations are included in the
ENGOs strategy or aims as an expected utility gains for the group. Members
also care for their selsh - personal utility and for the public welfare.17 Even if
the impure altruistic motivations are individual characteristics, on a collective
level they can characterize a groups behavior. Like for example in the case of
collective reputations (Tirole, 1996) or like in the case of the groups interest
for social status (Weiss and Fershtman, 1998). However impure altruism
15In this study the term impure altruism characterizes these motivations which focus
on memberssatisfaction (utility) and not only on the environmental improvement.
16The personal emotional-psychological-sociological motivations in the provision of the
public goods theory belong to the impure altruism analysis. For a detailed analysis on
the types of altruism see Khalil (2004).
17O¤course someone could care only for the personal utility, for a psychographic analysis
of the volunteers see Dolnicar and Randle (2007).
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could be benecial for the group and for the society. As Tullberg (2006)
argues, rational atomic egoism could increase total social welfare.
I will use an example in order to explain the positive relation between
impure altruism and the social welfare. Consider the case where an industry
pollutes with liquid waste the water of a lake. The specic pollution a¤ects
negatively the quality and quantity of living organisms in the lake; hence
the consumersdemand for sh from the lake is decreasing. However a team
of activists, through their action, exert pressure on the industry to improve
the production process to a greener level. Now imagine that a member of
the activists is also a sherman who works on the lake. Then the sherman
participates in the group because he cares for the environment as well as
for his job. A lake with lower waste or without waste can support more and
healthier sh. Thus, the shermans motivation is impurely altruistic because
he has a self interest in the action pursued. I assume that the activists will
achieve their objective and the lake is cleaner than before. So the ora and
the fauna of the lake will improve. Hence the public can enjoy more and
healthier sh from the lake than in the case with the liquid waste. As a
result social welfare is higher than before.
Collective impure altruistic motivations o¤er internal personal satisfac-
tion to the members and may add some bonus to the ENGO. For each ENGO,
the level of e¤ectiveness on environmental issues increases the groupspres-
tige, reputation, political power and potentiality. Hence the group could
win some points of appreciation, benets or respect by the policy-makers.18
This bonus may be useful for the group for the cases of the environmental
negotiations with the government or for the ENGOs participation in interna-
18Johansson-Stenman (2005) includes the expectation of the reputation as a possible
motivation for a rich country which care for the poor country in the case of the global
environmental problems. Concretely the rich country will help the pour because the rst
will win international reputation between the rich countries. This reputation could help
the rich country in negotiations. In my study an ENGO has the same motivation, to
win more reputation by the government which could be a benet for the ENGO under a
situation of bilateral negotiations for environmental issues.
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tional negotiations. Consequently there is a positive impact of the decisions
makersmotivations on the groups strategy which simultaneously benet the
group. The personal motivations encourage not only the individuals but also
the ENGO and the public welfare.
One could note that the above benets which emanate from the ENGOs
e¤ective action are positive externalities, but if there is a programmed ex-
pectation or desire for these benets (reputation, social and political power,
satisfaction) then this is a case of impure altruism. Thus, the environmen-
tal group has a strategy with more objects than the pure altruistic targets.
Thence, there is an interaction between the ENGO pure altruistic targets
and the impure altruistic expectations, and this interaction characterizes the
groups strategy. Actually, there is a connection between the membersim-
pure altruism with the size of the group and the e¢ ciency of the groups ac-
tivities (environmental protection) as well as with the revenues of the group.
The impure altruistic expectations drive the individuals to participate in the
group as members (then larger the size of the group is) and can a¤ect posi-
tively the actions of the group. Accordingly, the total revenues of the group
are rising. Of course in this case it is accepted that the impure altruism only
positively inuences the group.
In a deeper anthropological, sociological and psychological analysis the
managersdecisions are related to the social interactions or with other agents
decisions according to the preferences, the expectations and the constraints
(Manski, 2000). In our study the decisions and the strategy of the groups
managers depends - for example - on the governmentsdecisions (e.g. an
anti-environmental legislation plan) or from the industriespollution meth-
ods. Hence the groups decisions (and probably the groups existence) em-
anates from the others decisions (industry and government) which create a
disutility for the environment and for the citizens but also trigger some feel-
ings or emotions in the ENGOs members. As a result the managers or the
group (members from the same group tend to have similar behavior, Manski,
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2000)19 will take decisions according to the disutility which a¤ects them and
according to their emotions.20
An unfair industrial method or an unfair law creates rage and anger in
the members of the group because of the specic injustice situation (Lerner
and Tiedens, 2006). Thus, the emotions and the feelings can a¤ect the
managersdecisions (Elster, 1998; Loewenstein, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens,
2006), through the neuro-economics approaches on the individuals deci-
sions (Camere et al., 2004; Singer and Fehr, 2005). An external situation
for each player is internalised by the feelings which, through the humans
neuron-system transferred in the pole of the decision-making -brain- and can
a¤ect the choices (Neuroeconomics).21 Individuals expect that the result
from the groups reaction and decisions can satisfy their emotions or the feel-
ings. Hence this is another case of self-interest where the decisions are guided
by the emotion-feelings because the agents expect the analogous satisfaction
(or utility).22 However it is not in the aims of this study to conduct a deeper
analysis of the agentsdecisions or motivations based on their emotions and
feelings.
Following the analysis in this section, we highlight that there exists an in-
teraction between the groups targets and the impure altruistic expectations,
an essential relation which characterizes the groups strategy.
19According to Manski (2000), members from the same group tend to have similar
behavior. So even if some heterogeneity exists among the membersthis will not a¤ect the
groups choice or decision-making.
20For the inuence of the emotion on the decision making see Reid and Gonzalez-Vallejo
(2008).
21For an extensive analysis for the function of the brain and the relation with the
economics see e.g. Neu (2008).
22A laboratory experiment show that the emotions are also connected with the individ-
uals decisions for high or low risk choices (Druckman and McDermott, 2008).
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3 Lobby with impure altruism and free-riders
In this section the level of the contribution or e¤ort from each member of
the group on the groups lobby is analysed. Lobby is a major tool for the
environmental groups which can inuence governmentals policy and rms
decisions. In order to focus on the relation of the impure altruism with the
level of the memberscontribution I assume that the size of the group has
already been shaped. However, this assumption is close to the reality given
that in a short-period analysis the size of the group increases a little or is
immutable.23
It is essential to note that the model and the characteristics of it belongs to
the area of "identity economics" as it is described from Akerlof and Kranton
(2010). Therefore a necessary requirement is to keep the model at a very
parsimonious level following Akerlof and Kranton (2010, p.114) in order to
focus on the issue of the members and groups impure altruism. Additionally,
the approach of the model is based on the models for the voluntary provision
of the public good (e.g. McEvoy, 2009) and therefore I adopt the specic style
of payo¤s equations from McEvoy (2009) as well as a number of assumptions
for the design of the model. However there are some di¤erences which make
the model of this chapter di¤erent than the previous studies and which I
analyse in the rest of this section. Besides, it is important for the reader
to keep in his mind that the assumptions and the methodology adopted in
this model emanates from the existing literature. However, in the end of the
section I discuss further the consequences of relaxing the assumptions and
some possible extra considerations as well as how robust the model is.
The e¢ ciency of the lobby depends from the level of the collective par-
ticipation in the lobbys action and in all the other essential processes for
the realisation of the lobby (e.g. citizens information, public education, par-
23Only the registered participants are characterised with the term; members. So some-
one will withdraw his membership if will not renew it for the next period. Given this the
number of the registered members cannot be decreased in the short-period.
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ticipation in media, letters to households, concentration of signatures, etc.).
Therefore, the lower the number of the free-riders is, the higher will be the
probability for a successful lobby. In addition, the e¢ ciency of the lobby
depends on the level of the memberscontribution to the lobby or simply;
How much is the e¤ort that each member will invest on the lobby activity?
Hence, the e¢ ciency of the lobby depends also on the level of the members
contribution on the lobby.
However, there is a cost (c) for the groups lobby like the e¤ort, the
human-hours, nancial cost for the organisation of the lobby, etc. Moreover
the cost for the lobby will be shared among the participating members (Lai,
2003). Following Epstein and Mealem (2009), a quadratic form of payo¤
function is adopted in order to reect the presence of diminishing returns
to scale. In other words the e¤orts of the members have decreasing returns
where according to Epstein and Mealem, «Sending the rst e-mail has a
stronger e¤ect than sending the second e-mail...Under this scenario, the e¤ect
each individual has in a group of size N , by sending one e-mail, will be
stronger than the e¤ect of only one individual in the group sendingN e-mails.
The probability of winning, therefore, depends not only on the total amount
of resources invested in the contest but also on the number of individuals
investing their e¤orts» .
Following the previous analysis for the type of the members we assume
that there are members in the group with two di¤erent characteristics; a)
The members who have collective sensitivity for the environmental protection
and they care only for the quality of the environment or for the provision
of the public good (non-selsh member). b) The members with personal
incentives which they care not only for the environment (or not at all for
the environmental protection) but for their selsh gains like the warm glow
feeling (selsh member).
The payo¤ function for the selsh members is equal to
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s = bqs + aqs   cq2s (1)
where, according to McEvoy (2009), the parameter b is the constant mar-
ginal benet of contributing to the public good (environment), c is the cost
of the contribution and qs is the level of a (selsh members in our case)
contribution. An example of the constant marginal benet of contribution
could be the benets that a local community has if will react against to the
illegal deforestation in the Amazon and will protect the trees. Thus, a pos-
sible benet could be the supply of clean oxygen from the trees or/and the
conservation of the local biodiversity (ora and fauna).
Furthermore, I introduce the parameter a (a  0) which represents the
selsh members level of impure altruism. In other words, for each member
the expected warm glow feeling or the expected personal gains from his con-
tribution to the lobby has di¤erent value. Hence, the level of a it depends
from how much each member appreciate his expected personal utility and
therefore the members are heterogeneous. A possible case of heterogeneity
between two selsh member originates from the di¤erence between the level
of the warm glow feeling that one selsh - member appreciates that will gain
and the level of the reputation/famous that the second selsh-member ap-
preciates that will receive from the media if both of them will try to protect
the same trees in Amazon.
From the rst order condition the optimum level of contribution for each
selsh member is
qs =
a+ b
2c
(2)
and given that the cost c is xed and the parameter b constant, the level of
the optimum contribution di¤ers from member to member according to the
value of a.24 Furthermore, in McEvoy (2009) if someone will contribute then
24The second order condition is negative @
2s
@q2s
=  2c.
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the value of q is 1 and 0 if he will not contribute. In my case the level of the
contribution depends from the value of a. Thus, the level of the contribution
(or e¤ort) is characterised by a possible available spectrum of values.
Remark 1 The higher is the selsh members expected personal gain the
more he/she will contribute to the groups lobby.
Furthermore, if the member cares only for his personal utility then b = 0
and if he cares only for the environmental protection then a = 0. Also if the
member has mixed motivations then for b > a the member has more interest
for the environmental protection than his personal gains and for the opposite
case (b < a) the opposite holds. The selsh member will be free-rider only if
a = b = 0. Besides, the level of his contribution depends positively from the
expected personal gains from his contribution to the lobby.
Similarly, the payo¤ function for the members who care for the environ-
mental protection only is given by
v = bqv   cq2v (3)
and contrary with the selsh members the non-selsh members have interest
for the quality of the environment only. Again, from the rst order condition
the optimum level of theirs contribution is
qv =
b
2c
(4)
which actually is the same with the optimum contribution from the selsh
members when their motivation for personal satisfaction is absent.
From the expression (2) and (4) we could compare the level of the con-
tribution to the groups lobby for each member respectively. Specically,
the selsh member contributes more to the lobby or o¤ers more e¤ort for
a > 0 than the non-selsh member given that qs > q

v . Hence, from the
groups viewpoint the more e¤ort emanates from the selsh members if the
free-riding issue is absent, (a  0; b 6= 0).
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Therefore for the group the payo¤ function is the sum of the payo¤ from
the selsh and the non-selsh members
g =
NsX
i=1
s +
NX
j=Nv
v (5)
where N = Nv + Ns is the total number of the members in the group. In
order to simplify the function and without loss of generality, we assume that
there is one non-selsh member and one selsh member in the group. Thus,
the groups payo¤ is g = s+v and after the substitution of the optimum
level of contribution for each member the function is
g =
(a+ b)2 + 2b2
4c
(6)
hence, the higher is the selsh members personal utility the higher will be
the groups payo¤ from the lobby or simply, the desire of the selsh member
for personal gains increases the groups payo¤.
Remark 2 The groups payo¤ is increasing in the selsh members desire
for personal gains.
Therefore, the impure altruism is a motivation for the members par-
ticipation in the lobby activity. The absence of the impure altruism could
be one reason which causes the existence of free-riders in the environmental
groupscollective actions. Furthermore, even in a group with homogeneous
members, like in the case of the Olsonian theory, the impure altruistic mo-
tivation encourages the players to participate in the groupsactivities even
if the potential memberscontribution will have relatively low inuence on
the groups outcome.25 This remark is in conformity with Olsons view that
there are private incentives for each individual. So, the provision of the pub-
lic good may emanate from the desire for private inducements (hence, the
25For homogeneous environmental group with pure and impure altruistic members see
Jouvet et al. 2000.
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provision of the public good is a by-product which origins from the indi-
vidualshunting for the satisfaction of the private motivations). Moreover,
without the private motivation the level of the free riding could be higher
and may dominates the groups action. In a nal analysis, there is a win-
win situation which emanates from the self-interests motivations. The group
will have more lobby power, given the low (or zero) level of free-riders, so
more e¢ cient will be the groups lobby to the regulator and the members
will satisfy their im(pure) expectations.
The approaching on the issue of the free riding and the relation with the
selsh - members motivations could enriched if we add the groups interest
for the attraction of more funds which automatically is connected with the
size of the groups as it was discussed in the sections 2.1 and 2.2. For example
we could assume that each member (N members in the group) will attract
a specic amount of funds X (for example lets assume that one member
will attract X2 amount of £ ). Also the cost for the group in order to attract
members is P c for each memberM who will decide to participate in the group
but the group had a cost in order to attract him/her. Hence, M 2 [0; N ].
Then the groups payo¤ will be
g =
NsX
i=1
s +
NX
j=Nv
v +NX
2   P cM (7)
and this could be a more complex analysis on the groups behavior, strategy
or objectives. However, as it is reported in the beginning of this section the
aim is to keep the model parsimonious and to avoid higher level of complexity
Thus, the way that I presented the model indicates that the group will not
have any cost in order to attract members (or some of them) and do not
focus on the attraction of external (or even internal) funds. However, this
will not inuence the robustness of the model given that it is focused more
on the membersbehavior and the di¤erence between selsh and non selsh
behavior under the case of a lobby rather than on the groups behavior. Of
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course under a game theoretical model where the group will play rst (and
the members after) it becomes essential a further analysis on the groups
motivations and payo¤s equation. Besides, as it is the model the next step
of research is the case where the members have the opportunity to participate
to more ecological - activistic actions provided by the groups like for example
the protection of two lakes or two rivers where some members working on
these as shermen. Then, the question is which members will participate
to which activities and which lobby could be more e¢ cient? Alternative,
what will happen if there are two environmental groups which compete each
other for members, funds etc but also the two groups protect the same lake?
These could be some of the possible extensions on the previous model but it
is outside from the scope of this chapter the extension of the existing model.
4 Discussion
One part of the analysis agrees with Olsons theory for the importance of
the personal (individuals) motivations and its contribution on the collective
action for the provision of the public good. This theory also applies for the
case of the environmental groups. In addition, the group (leaders, managers,
etc) has a positive reaction to the individuals-memberspersonal motivations
or incentives and the group participates to these expectations because, in a
nal analysis, the personal motivations could benet the action and the sur-
vival of the group. Hence, following Olson, the environmental groups provide
the material and non-material benets to the individuals in order to attract
them in the group and/or to enrich the level of the groups budget. Thus,
the ENGOs have reasons to contribute and to maintaining the existence of
the individuals-membersselective incentives or selsh motivations.
In contrast the rest of the analysis indicates the provision of the public
good where the participants have only collective motivations or collective
sensitivity for the environmental protection and the personal incentives are
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absent. In this case the Olsons theory is weak because the provision of
the public good origins from the collective sensitivity (Finkel and Muller,
1998). Besides, in some cases, environmental groups are trying to annihilate
the provision of the personal motivations and provide the need for collective
incentives (King and Walker, 1992).
The above theories have been analysed in the economic and political lit-
erature and it is essential to note that in reality the environmental groups
include an amalgam of members, with personal motivations and with col-
lective incentives or/and members with collective and personal motivations
both. Because the collective and the private motivations are related, the
succeed groups output could enrich the private satisfaction and the private
satisfaction encourages the collective action. Environmental group with a
mix of homogeneous members strengthen the action of the group, therefore
the groups output (like the lobby) is more e¢ cient.
5 Conclusions
This paper reviews the literature on the behavior of Environmental Non
Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) in order to explore the obvious and
non-obvious motivations. I focus on three interrelated factors which seem
to be signicant for the groups sustainability and strategy; the groups size,
budget and impure altruism. These motivations characterise ENGOs ratio-
nal behavior and with the environmental targets constitute the contemporary
strategy of the group.
I point out that a positive relation exists between the group size and
philanthropic contributions by third parties, like grants from the government
and donations by individuals. Hence, part of the groups target is increas-
ing membership which directly or indirectly enhances the available budget.
Moreover the members anthropocentric-impure altruistic motivations like
the rational economic pursuit, the warm glow feeling, prestige, reputation,
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social status, egoism and other individualsaspirations characterise overall
the group. But the impure altruistic motivation could improve the position
of the group in the society and may increase social welfare. Hence it is clear
that the environmental groups except from the provision of the public good
or the environmental protection have more targets. Some of these emanate
from external conditions like the sustainability of the group (rational use of
the groups resources) or from individual objectives like personal satisfaction
(economic gains, political inuence, internal feelings, etc). Therefore, each
group has di¤erent targets and the e¢ ciency of the group, except for the
environmental improvement, could depend from the priority for each target
(e.g. budget, membership, etc) and if the group will reach the targets.
Furthermore the relation between the membersimpure altruism and the
groups level of free-riders is analysed. I show that may exists a negative re-
lation between the level of the impure altruism and the size of the free-riders
and a positive with the selsh memberslevel of contribution to the group.
Thus, the higher is the level of the impure altruism the lower is the size of
the free-riders and the more e¢ cient is the groups e¤orts. Also the higher
operational cost could reduces the number of the membersparticipation in
the ENGOs lobby as well as the level of their contribution. So the cost
positively inuences, the level of the free-riders in the group. However, con-
trary to the previous result, a part of the members participate in the group
because they characterised by collective incentives or sensitivity for the en-
vironmental protection. Therefore, the group includes members with mix
motivations. Finally, all categories of members are essential for the function
and the survival of the environmental group where the ENGO is conserving
the memberscollective and personal incentives or motivations.
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CHAPTER 3
Technological choice under environmentalists
participation in Emissions Trading Systems1
1 Introduction
Emissions trading systems (ETS henceforth) are market based instru-
ments used to control pollution. The idea of the ETSs or permits markets
has its origins in Coase (1960) and Dales (1968) and relies upon the creation
of economic incentives to reduce pollution through the exchange of permits.
Following the Kyoto Protocol (1998) ETSs have become major tools in the
anti-pollution policy in a number of countries.2
Interestingly, several legal frameworks opened up the participation in the
Emissions Trading System not only to rms but also to third parties, such
as citizens, consumers, environmental organizations, etc. This right to par-
ticipate is contemplated, for example, in the United Nations Framework
Convention for Climate Change (Guidelines FCCP/ CP/ 2001/ 2/ Add.4)
and in the EUs Directive 2003/87/EC. Similarly, in the US, third parties
can participate in the Sulphur Allowance Trading Program (SAT) and in the
Clean Air Incentives Scheme (RECLAIM). Groups such as the Acid Retire-
ment Fund and the Clean Air Conservancy Trust in the US or Sandbag in
the UK are examples of NGOs who use their funds (mainly collected through
1The present chapter is joint work with Dr. Maria Jose Gil-Molto. This work has been
presented in a plethora of conferences and workshops like the; EARIE 2009, and Conference
on the International Dimensions of Climate Policies 2009, and 1st PhD Conference in
Economics in Memory of Vassilis Patsatzis 2008, and AFSE 2008, and JEI 2008, and 16th
Ph.D. Workshop on International Climate Policy 2008. We thank the participants for
their helpful comments and useful discussions as well as J.C. Bárcena-Ruíz, B. Dijkstra,
R. Faulí-Oller, N. Georgantzís and P. Zanchettin.
2For example, in the US, there are ETSs in place for the reduction of SOX and NOX
emissions. Also, the European Union (EU) has implemented an ETS for the reduction of
CO2. This is the largest application of ETS in geographic terms (Newbery, 2008).
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charitable donations) to purchase permits from ETSs. By withdrawing per-
mits from the market, this type of organisations aim at increasing the price of
polluting and therefore at inducing rms to invest in technologies to reduce
their emissions.3
Some theoretical contributions have studied the reasons why third parties
should be allowed to participate in ETSs (Smith and Yates, 2003a, 2003b;
Shrestha, 1998). Generally, it is argued that the participation by third parties
gives valuable information to the regulator regarding the market equilibrium
when the regulator faces uncertainty.4 Interestingly, the academic literature
has already provided empirical evidence on the presence of the thirds in ETS
and its e¤ects (see Schwarze and Zapfel, 2000; Israel, 2007; and Joskow et
al. 1998).
Despite the relevance of the issue, the literature on ETS and technology
choice has largely overlooked the implications of third partiesparticipation
for rmstechnological choices. However, a related literature strand has ex-
plored the linkages between the existence of policies against climate change
and the degree of technological change. For example, Newell et al. (1999)
and Popp (2002) analyze how higher energy prices induce a higher techno-
logical innovation.5 Some other contributions have compared the propensity
to technological innovation generated by several market-based instruments
(Fischer et al., 2003; Requate and Unold, 2003; and Kerr and Newell, 2003),
reaching mixed conclusions.
The objective of our paper is to study the interaction of rms and envi-
3For example, this objective is very clearly stated in the Acid Rain Retirement Funds
ethos.
4For some other references showing the advantages of allowing citizens to take part in
the ETS can be found in English and Yates (2007) and Rousse (2008) and Eshel and Sexton
(2009). Malueg and Yates (2006) also show that the citizens may prefer to participate in
the permitsmarket under a grandfathered system instead of lobbying the regulator to
reduce the total number of allocated permits.
5See also Chakravorty et al. (1997). On the other hand, Goulder and Schneider (1999)
and Goulder and Mathai (2000) examine the implications of Induced Technological Change
(ITC) for CO2 abatement policy.
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ronmental groups in ETS and the implications of this for rmstechnological
choices. We introduce an oligopsony which must purchase permits in an ETS.
Firms can choose the type of production technology they will use. The tech-
nologies available to rms di¤er in their environmental credentials: The more
polluting the production techology is, the more permits the rm requires per
unit of output. We allow an environmental group to purchase (and therefore
withdraw) permits from the market. The price of the permits will depend on
the aggregation of the rmsand the environmentalistsdemand of permits.
Therefore, the participation of the environmentalists a¤ects the price of the
permits and the incentives to adopt a less polluting technology.
In the spirit of Andreoni (1989, 1990) we assume that the members of
the group gain a non-material utility from withdrawing permits.6 Andreoni
(1989, 1990) highlights that people are impurely altruistic, as they obtain
some gains in utility (warm glow) from charitable giving. Interestingly, there
is ample experimental evidence of impure altruism in public good games (see
for example Palfrey and Prisbey, 1996, 1997, and Goeree, Holt and Laury,
2002). In our paper, we assume that the environmentalists act partly driven
by the warm glow. This "impurely altruistic" behavior introduces a distor-
tion in the market. We will study how the emission levels and technological
choice are a¤ected by the environmentalistspresence in the ETS and their
degree of impure altruism and will compare the equilibrium outcomes with
and without their participation.
Our results show that there is a U-shape relationship between how pollut-
ing the chosen technology is and the degree of the environmentalistsimpure
altruism. Moreover, we show that rms tend to choose a more polluting
technology in the presence of the environmentalists in the ETS than in their
absence if the environmentalists are characterised by high degrees of impure
altruism. Although higher degrees of impure altruism can actually induce
6We consider members of the group not only the activists but also the donors or con-
tributors to the group.
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rms to adopt worse technologies, they can also lead to lower emissions lev-
els through the reduction of output.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present
our model. In section 3 we analyse the technology choice by rms when
the environmentalists do not participate in the ETS. In section 4, we study
the case where environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS. In section 5 we
conduct a comparative static analysis regarding technology choices, emissions
and output levels in both settings. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In our model, two monopolistic rms act as oligopsonists in the permits
market. Each rm faces a linear inverse demand function such as7
Pi = a  qi (1)
where qi is rm is level of output produced by rm i.
Prior to start producing, rms choose their manufacturing technology
from a spectrum of available technologies which di¤er in the level of emissions
derived from the production of each unit of output. Firms must buy permits
to o¤set their emissions.8
The choice of technology determines the number of permits required to
produce each unit of output. We denote the number of permits required
per unit of output by k and will use k to index the technologies available to
rms. The greener (the more environmentally friendly) the technology is, the
lower its associated k. The total number of emissions and, as a consequence,
7We do not contemplate the case where there is competition in the nal market so that
to be able to isolate the e¤ect of competition in the permits market.
8One interpretation of our model is that the rms are new entrants to the market and
they do not receive permits through grandfathering. Alternatively, even with grandfather-
ing, rms may not have enough permits with their initial allocation. In that case, the
demand of permits would represent the extra permits needed above the initial allocation.
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the total number of permits demanded by rm i depends on the type of
technology (how polluting the technology is) and the level of output chosen
by rm i
yi = kiqi: (2)
We assume that the available technologies di¤er also in the investment
required to adopt them
Fi = (1  ki)2: (3)
Our modelling of the technology costs implies that adopting a greener
technology entails higher adoption costs than adopting a more polluting one.
The innovation costs are assumed to be quadratic to reect the existence of
diminishing returns to investment. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
ki 2 (0; 1).
We assume that rms do not incur in any other production costs than
those derived from the acquisition of permits, that is
Ci(yi) = R
eyi: (4)
All in all, rmsprots can be written as follows
i = Piqi  Reyi   (1  ki)2: (5)
We assume that there is a third player in the permits market : an environ-
mental group. The environmentalists can withdraw permits from the market
by purchasing a number x of permits, thereby a¤ecting the equilibrium price
in the permits market. The (aggregate) demand of permits will therefore be
the sum of the permits demanded by rm i and j and by the environmental-
ists (yi + yj + x). According to standard properties of demand and supply,
we assume that the (equilibrium) price of permits, Re, is increasing in the
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demand of permits. We dene Re as9
Re = c+ h(yi + yj + x): (6)
where we normalise c to 0 and h to 1. Our modelling of the price of permits
di¤ers from those contributions which assume that rms are price-takers and
also from those contributions, such as Boyd and Conley (1997) and Conley
and Smith (2005), where citizens can buy permits at personalized prices.
We assume that the environmentalists are impurely altruists, that is their
behavior is (partly) driven by the maximisation of their own utility. The en-
vironmentalistsmaximise the utility gained from withdrawing permits (zx)
minus the externalities (E) and the cost of withdrawing permits (Rx). The
environmental groups objective function (
) therefore is:

 =  E  Rex+ zx: (7)
The last term in 
 is related to the impure altruism which characterises
the environmental group. In our model, the degree of impure altruism is mea-
sured by a parameter, z, which represents the utility gains experienced by the
environmentalists from withdrawing one unit of permits. More generally, the
parameter z can be interpreted as the extra weight that the environmentalists
give to the reduction of emissions.10
We assume that there is one unit of externality produced per each unit
of emissions
E =
2X
i=1
yi: (8)
9Note that we are modelling the supply of permits only implicitly. As our main focus
is the interaction between the price of the permits and the technological choices of rms,
we refrain from going one step backwards and modelling in detail the supply side of the
ETS.
10Our model is related to Ahlheim and Schneider (2002), as we also (implicitly) introduce
the third partiespreferences in our model. However, in their contribution the third party
in the ETS can sell permits.
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From now on, we will use the term "emissions" as a synonym of "exter-
nalities" or "pollution". The timing of the game is as follows: In the rst
stage, rms choose their production technologies.11 In the second stage, the
environmentalists purchase permits. In the last stage, rms choose quantities
(implicitly determining their demand for permits).12 We assume that rms
choose simultaneously in stages 1 and 3. We solve the game by backwards
induction to analyse the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). For
comparison purposes, we also solve the model without the environmental-
istsparticipation (that is, x = 0 and the game is reduced to stages 1 and
3). We use subscript G (NG) to denote the solutions to the case where the
environmentalists are allowed (are not allowed) to participate in the ETS.
All proofs to our lemmata and propositions are relegated to the appendix.
3 The environmentalists are not allowed to
participate in the ETS market
In this section, we solve the game where the environmentalists are excluded
from the ETS market. Therefore, x is set to be zero (x = 0). In the last
stage, rms choose their output levels in order to maximize their prots. The
rst order condition (FOC henceforth) yields:
@i
@qi
= a  2qi   k2i qi   ki(kiqi + kjqj) = 0: (9)
Solving for qi, we obtain rm is reaction function,
qRi;NG =
a  kikjqj
2(1 + ki)2
: (10)
11As technology choices imply a long term commitment, we assume that they take place
in the rst stage.
12Reducing the second and third stages to a single stage where rms and environmen-
talists take decisions simultaneously does not alter qualitative our results.
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From the reaction functions we can see that although rms do not com-
pete in the nal product market, their output levels are negatively related
(@qRi =@qj =  kikj < 0 for any ki; kj 2 (0; 1)). This implies that rmsde-
cisions on output are strategic substitute. Furthermore, the more polluting
each of the rmsmanufacturing technologies are (that is, the higher ki and
kj are), the stronger that relationship is. In fact, their output levels are
not independent from each others because the price of permits (which af-
fects rmsmarginal cost of production) depends on both rmsdemand for
permits, which, in turn depend on their respective output levels and techno-
logical choices.
Solving the system of reaction functions, we obtain the equilibrium level
of output13
qi;NG =
a(2  kikj + 2k2j )
4(1 + k2j ) + k
2
i (4 + 3k
2
j )
: (11)
It is easy to see that the derivative of qi;NG with respect to ki
@qi;NG
@ki
=
 a(kj(4(1 + k2j ) + k2i (4 + 3k2j )) + 2ki(4 + 3k2j )((2  kikj + 2k2j )))
(4(1 + k2j ) + k
2
i (4 + 3k
2
j ))
2
;
(12)
is negative for any ki; kj 2 (0; 1). This implies that the more polluting
the technology used by rms is, the less they produce. The intuition for
this is that as ki increases, rms require more permits to produce the same
level of output. As a consequence, the price of permits rises (due to more
permits being demanded). This increases rm is marginal cost of production,
inducing rm i to decrease its output. Our next lemma summarises our rst
result.
13The second order conditions (SOCs henceforth) for a maximum are fullled.
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Lemma 3 qi;NG is decreasing in ki.
Substituting qi;NG and q

j;NG into rmsprot maximising and rearranging
yields
i(q

i;NG) = (1 + k
2
i )(q

i;NG)
2   (1  ki)2: (13)
In the rst stage, rms choose ki to maximise their prots. The rst order
condition yields
@i
@ki
= 2ki(q

i;NG)
2 + 2(qi;NG)
@qi;NG
@ki
(1 + k2i ) + 2(1  ki) = 0: (14)
Using the implicit function theorem we can characterise the relationship
between the equilibrium k in symmetry, kNG, and the parameters of the
model, a and : Our nding is the following14:
Proposition 1: kNG is increasing in  and decreasing in a.
In other words, the higher  and the lower a, the more polluting rms
technology will be in the absence of the environmentalists from the ETS.
Both a and  are related to the protability of the investment in technol-
ogy. Although the parameter  is invariant with the technology choice, it
magnies the di¤erences between the costs of adopting a clean or a polluting
technology. Essentially  scales up the di¤erences in the technology costs.
As a consequence, the higher , the more expensive "cleaner" (lower k) tech-
nologies are relative to "more polluting" (higher k) ones.
The parameter a is related to the market size and therefore to the prof-
itability (other things being equal) of investing in a "greener" technology.
14The SOC for a maximum holds for any k 2 (0; 1) for  > 0:08601a2. We assume that
 and a take values that fulll this inequality so that to guaranee the existence of interior
solutions.
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Higher market sizes (higher a) will lead to higher output levels (other things
being equal). This, in turn, will lead to higher demand of permits and there-
fore higher permit prices. Given this, rms have a stronger incentive to invest
in a "greener" technology in larger markets.
4 The environmentalists are allowed to par-
ticipate in the ETS market.
In this section, we solve the game where the environmentalists can participate
in the ETS. In the last stage, rms choose their output levels in order to
maximize their prots. The rst order condition yields:
@i
@qi
= a  2qi   k2i qi   ki(kiqi + kjqj + x) = 0: (15)
Solving for qi, we obtain the rm is reaction function
qRi;G =
a  kikjqj   kix
2(1 + ki)2
: (16)
As in the case without the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS,
rmsoutputs are strategic substitutes, even in the absence of competition
in the product market. As before, the more polluting each of the rms
manufacturing technologies are (that is, the higher ki and kj are), the stronger
that strategic substitutability between their outputs. Furthermore, rm is
output and the number of permits withdrawn by the environmentalists are
also strategic substitutes. This relationship is stronger, the more polluting
the technology chosen by rm i is.
Solving the system of reaction functions, we obtain the equilibrium level
of output15
15The SOCs for a maximum are fullled.
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qi;G =
a(2  kikj + 2k2j )  ki(2 + k2j )x
4(1 + k2j ) + k
2
i (4 + 3k
2
j )
: (17)
Substituting qi;G into the environmentalistsobjective function and rear-
ranging yields

 =  
2X
i=1
(kiq

i;G) Rx+ zx: (18)
The environmentalists choose the number of permits to buy, x, in order
to maximise their objective function, 
. This maximisation problem has a
solution xG(ki; kj) which is
xG =
2(k2j + k
2
i (1 + k
2
j ))  a'+ z 
2(2 + ki)2(2 + kj)2
; (19)
where ' = 2kj+k2i kj+ki(2+k
2
j ) and  = 4(1+kj)
2+k2i (4+3k
2
j ).
16 In order
to analyse the behavior of the environmentalists, it is su¢ cient to analyse xG
in symmetry, as the two markets and rms are symmetric and they receive
the same weight in the environmentalistsobjective function (in other words,
the environmentalists do not care more about the emissions by one rm or
the other). xG(ki;kj) evaluated in symmetry (ki = kj = k) is
xGjki=kj=k =
 2ak + 2k2 + z(2 + 3k2)
2(2 + k2)
: (20)
Several interesting observations can be made from xG. The following
proposition summarises them:
Proposition 2: xG is decreasing in a and increasing in z . Furthermore,
xG > 0 requires small enough a and/or large enough z .
Interestingly, the equilibrium number of withdrawn permits is decreasing
16The SOC for a maximum are fullled.
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in a. As discussed above, the higher a is (the larger the market), the more
protable investing on a less polluting technology is. Therefore, the higher
a, the less necessary it is to induce rms to adopt "greener" technologies by
making permits more scarce.
Furthermore, the number of permits withdrawn by the environmentalists
is increasing in z. The more impurely altruistic the environmentalists are,
the higher weight the withdrawal of permits has relative to the welfare terms
in their utility functions, thus, increasing the number of permits withdrawn
in equilibrium.
Finally, for relatively large values of a and/or relatively low values of z,
the environmentalists would not participate in the ETS, as xG  0:That is,
the environmentalists choose not to withdraw any permits in those circum-
stances. This may constitute another explanation for Israel (2007)s observa-
tion that the environmentalists have not been participating very intensively
in ETSs: Non-participation might be the result of the environmentalistsop-
timization problem, a voluntary decision of excluding themselves from the
ETS.
Before solving the rst stage, it is interesting to conduct some comparative
statics regarding the e¤ect of the technology choice on the level of output
when the environmentalists are present in the ETS. This will allow us to
formulate lemma 2, which is the counterpart to lemma 1 for the case without
the environmentalistsparticipation. Substituting xG into q

i;G and analyzing
qi;G, we can state the following:
Lemma 4 qi;G is decreasing in ki.
In other words, as in the case without the environmentalists, there a
negative relationship between how polluting the production technology is
and the level of output in equilibrium.
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Now we proceed to solve the rst stage where rms choose technologies
to maximise prots. Substituting (19) into (17) and the latter into the prot
function and applying the FOC for maximisation yields
@i;G
@ki
= 2ki(q

i;G)
2 + 2(qi;G)
@qi;G
@ki
(1 + k2i ) + 2(1  ki) = 0: (21)
Unfortunately, the closed-form solution for the rst order condition is
again very intrincate, therefore we resort to the implicit function theorem to
characterise the relationship between the equilibrium k and z. Focusing on
the symmetric case and on the combinations of parameters where the SOCs
hold, we can state the following:
Proposition 3: There is a critical value of z, zcv, above (below) which kG(z)
is decreasing (increasing) in z. The critical value of z is increasing in a.
In other words, proposition 3 states that there is a U-shape relationship
between how polluting the chosen technologies are and the degree of impure
altruism in the symmetric equilibrium. As z increases, rms will tend to
invest in technologies that are less polluting (lower k) up until a critical
point of z, where increases in z will actually lead to investments in more
polluting technologies. The intuition behind this result is the following: As
z increases, the environmentalists tend to withdraw more permits from the
market. This has two e¤ects: First, rms tend to choose cleaner technologies,
as the marginal cost of producing is higher due to the lower number of permits
which are required per unit of output. Second, rms reduce their output
levels (note that qi is decreasing in x). As rms reduce their production
levels, the investment in cleaner technologies becomes less protable. The
interaction between these two e¤ects will determine the technology choice.
For low levels of z, the rst e¤ect dominates the second e¤ect. However,
for high levels of z, the second e¤ect dominates. Proposition 3 also states
that zcv is increasing in a. In other words, larger market sizes make the
78
second e¤ect above (reduction of output) less likely to outweight the rst
e¤ect (technology substitution).17
5 Comparative Analysis
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes (technology choices,
levels of output and emissions by rms i and j) across the two cases solved
above, namely the ETS without the environmentalistsparticipation and the
ETS with the environmentalistsparticipation.
5.1 Technology choice
First, we compare the technology choice with and without the environmen-
talists participation. We have shown before that kG is a U-shaped with
respect to z. Further, kNG is not a function of z. The following proposition
compares kG and k

NG and shows that k

G > k

NG for one range of values of z
for each pair (a; ).
Proposition 4: For each pair of values (a; ), there is a critical value of z,
zl beyond which kG > k

NG.
Proposition 4 shows that the participation of the environmentalists will
lead to higher permit prices than in they were not participating. This will
lead to the two e¤ects discussed above: Technology substitution (higher per-
mit prices make the cleaner technology relatively cheaper) and output reduc-
tion (rms produce less because the increase in the price of permits implies
an increase in their marginal cost of production). As z increases, the second
e¤ect becomes stronger reducing the incentives to invest on "cleaner" tech-
nologies. It follows that there is a value of z (zl) which is high enough to
17Furthermore, it can be easily shown that  plays the same role as in the case without
the environmentalists participation, that is, kG is increasing in :
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induce the adoption of a more polluting technology than the one that would
be adopted in the absence of the environmentalists. Below this value of z,
the participation of the environmentalists will lead to the adoption of cleaner
technologies.
We can illustrate the above result with a numerical example. Recall that
the technological choice (in the absence of the environmentalists) depends
on a and : Take the case of a = 1:5 and  = 1, the technology choice
when the environmentalists are absent from the ETS yields kNG = 0:830.
Interestingly, the presence of the environmental group would render more
polluting technology choices (k higher than 0:830) for z > 1:286:
5.2 Output and Emissions
Here, we compare the equilibrium levels of output and emissions across the
two cases (with and without the environmentalitsparticipation in the ETS).
First, it is important to notice that for a given k, rms produce more in the
absence of the environmentalists. This also leads to a higher level of emissions
by the two rms purchasing permits. The following remark explains.
Lemma 5
2P
i=1
qi;G <
2P
i=1
qi;NG and
2P
i=1
yi;G <
2P
i=1
yi;G for a given k.
However, as the participation of the environmentalists in the permits
market will inuence rmstechnological choice, it is necessary to go beyond
the analysis of output and emissions levels for given values of k. In the
previous section, we have shown that rms will choose a more polluting
technology in the presence of the environmentalists than in their absence
for high values of z (z > zl). As a consequence of this, and given that the
equilibrium output levels are decreasing in k, we can state the following.
Proposition 5: The comparison of the cases with and without the environ-
mentalists participation yields the following results,
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i) kG  kNG and
2P
i=1
qi;G S
2P
i=1
qi;NG if z  zl.
ii) kG > k

NG and
2P
i=1
qi;G <
2P
i=1
qi;NG if z >zl.
Proposition 5 states that the participation of environmental groups in the
ETS can induce rms to adopt less polluting technologies and even reduce
their output levels as long as the environmentalists are not too impurely
altruistic. However, if the environmentalists are characterised by su¢ ciently
high degrees of impure altruism, rms will choose a manufacturing technology
which is more polluting than the one they would choose in the absence of
the environmentalists.
This last observation (proposition 5.ii) does not imply that the emissions
levels by rms i and j would actually increase if environmentalists charac-
terised by high degrees of impure altruism participated in the ETS. In fact,
proposition 5.ii emphasizes the existence of a trade-o¤ between the technol-
ogy choice and the level of output for higher degrees of impure altruism.
Interestingly, rms i and js emissions levels decrease despite the use of more
polluting technologies due to the lower levels of production. We can use some
numerical examples to illustrate this. Let us assume that a = 1 and  = 1; in
such a case, the equilibrium technology choice in the absence of the environ-
mentalists is kNG = 0:933 and each rms output (q

i;G) and emissions (y

i;G)
are respectively 0:216 and 0:203. Now assume that the environmentalists are
characterised by a (relatively) high degree of impure altruism, for example,
z = 1:1 (in this case, zl = 0:577). In such a case, the equilibrium technol-
ogy choice is more polluting (kG = 0:985) but individual emissions are lower
(yi;G = 0:022). The reason for this is that the two rms adjust their output
level downwards (individual output in this case is 0:022), resulting in a lower
emissions level by each rm.
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6 Policy Implications
From the analysis of the above results we show that the environmentalists
participation in the tradable permit market could inuence the rmstech-
nological choice, the level of the output as well as the level of the exter-
nalities (emissions). Following the Coasian theory, the policy-makers allow
to everybody the free participation in the ETS. Therefore, the victims have
the opportunity to react against to the polluters emissions, so, the mar-
ket will nd the equilibrium through the permitstransaction between the
participants (rms and third parties).
However, it is possible that the environmentalists participation (third
parties) in the ETS may drive the market to a worstequilibrium than in
the case without their participation. In this point is necessary to be claried
that; what is worst for the market or for the regulator is not necessary
worstby the environmental groups viewpoint. In order to make it easier,
we use a simple graph which can describe all the possible combination of
results for the technology, the output and the level of the emissions with and
without the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS.
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Figure 2: U-shape relation between k and z
k
cvz lz
0 1 2 3
NGk
z
As we show in the graph (where a = 1,  = 1), there is a U-shape rela-
tion between the rmstechnological choice (k) and the environmentalists
degree of impure altruism (z). Also, there is a critical value of z (zcv) which
corresponds to the greenerlevel of technology for each case. The horizontal
cut-line on the U-shape curve represents the case where, above this, the rms
will adopt a worst (more polluting) level of technology with the environmen-
talists than without them. Simply, for level of impure altruism higher than
the critical value zl the environmentalistsparticipation drives the rms to
adopt a more polluting technology compared to the rmstechnology without
the environmentalistsparticipation.
The vertical cut-line indicates the down limit of the impure altruism. In
other words, for low values of impure altruism (area 0) the environmental-
ists are satised with the rmslevel of emissions; hence, they choose to not
participate in the permit market. However for higher values of impure al-
truism (right from the vertical cut-line) the environmentalists prefer a larger
reduction of the externalities, hence, they will purchase and retire permits.
However, for values of impure altruism in the area 1 of the diagram, the
sum of emissions by the two rms with the environmentalistsparticipation
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(SEG) is larger than the analogous emissions without the greens (SENG).
Additionally, the level of the two rms sum of output is bigger with the greens
(SPG) than without them (SPNG). Consequently, in this case, the environ-
mentalistsparticipation increases the level of the total production and the
level of the total emissions in the area 1. Contrary to this case, in the area
2 (around of the critical value of z (zcv)), the aggregate level of production
is higher with the environmentalists than without them and the analogous
level of the emissions is lower with the greens than without. So, their par-
ticipation will induce the rms to adopt a better (greener) technology, the
rms will produce more and the level of the pollution will be lower. Finally,
in the area 3 on the graph, the environmentalistsparticipation in the permit
market (with high degree of impure altruism) will induce the rms to reduce
the level of the production (even if they will adopt a greener technology than
without the greens) as well as to decrease the level of the emissions. The
next table includes all the above results where SEG is the sum of emissions
by the two rms under environmentalists, SENG is the sum of emissions by
the two rms without environmentalists, SPG is the sum of output by the
two rms under environmentalists and SPNG is the sum of output by the
two rms without environmentalists.
Table 4: Emissions and production with and without environmentalists
Graph Area Sum of Emissions Sum of Production
1 SEG>SENG SPG>SPNG
2 SEG<SENG SPG>SPNG
3 SEG<SENG SPG<SPNG
Hence, the question which emanates from the above results is; what do
the regulator or the policy makers prefer? If the policy makers wish only the
environmental protection, then they prefer the environmentalists participa-
tion with intermediate or/and high values of impure altruism (area 2 and 3)
because for these cases there is a reduction of the emissionslevel. Besides,
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if the rmslevel of production is also an important factor for the regulator
then the area 2 (intermediate degrees of impure altruism) can satisfy the
both priorities in the policy makersagenda.
In reality, it is di¢ cult or impossible for the policy makers to have the
right knowledge for the third parties level of impure altruism, desire for
status, egoism, personal satisfaction and other personal qualitative charac-
teristics. Thus, on the one hand, it is possible that the environmentalists
participation (third parties) will deteriorate the environmental quality (area
1) or the markets level of production. On the other hand, if the partici-
pation in the ETS is not allowed to the greens then the market will never
nd the social equilibrium of the emissions, given that the victims will not
participate.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the participation of environmental groups in
the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and its e¤ects on rmstechnological
choices. We have analyzed the case where there are two rms in the tradable
permits market which are acting as duopsonists in the product market and
can choose their manufacturing technologies among a continuum of technolo-
gies which di¤er in their associated emissions per unit of output and their
set-up costs. We have assumed that "greener" technologies (lower emissions
per unit of output) are more expensive to adopt. In the spirit of Andreoni
(1989, 1990), we have also considered that the environmentalists are impurely
altruistic; that is, they decide on the number of permits to withdraw partly
driven by their own utility gains (warm glow).
We show that rms purchasing permits in the ETS tend to produce less
the more polluting their production technology is and that large market sizes
and low technology costs favour the adoption of less polluting technologies,
both with and without the environmentalistspresence in the ETS. Further-
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more, rmsdecisions on output levels are strategic interdependent even when
rms do not compete in the nal output market.
Our results also show that there is a U-shape relationship between how
polluting the chosen technologies are and the degree of impure altruism. In-
terestingly, the participation of the environmentalists in the ETS can induce
the adoption of production technologies which are "greener" than they would
be in the absence of the environmentalists. This requires that the environ-
mental group are characterized by not too high degrees of impure altruism.
In fact, for high degrees of impure altruism the presence of the environmen-
tal group in the ETS could actually induce rms to adopt a more polluting
(non-green) technology but also to produce less output (and emissions). For
lower degrees of impure altruism, the participation of the environmental-
ists would lead to the adoption of less polluting technologies and in some
circumnstances to lower output levels too.
We have conducted a number of checks to test the robustness of our
results to changes in the objective function of the environmental group. In
particular, including consumer or (even) producer welfare into the objective
function of the environmentalists does not a¤ect qualitatively any of them.
Therefore, one can conclude that it is far from clear that the participation
of third parties in ETS will necessarily induce technological improvements.
Further research would be certainly welcome in the topic of this paper. In
particular, it would be worthwhile to allow for various forms of competition
in the nal product market.
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Appendix
Lemma 3
Proof. It is immediate to see that the denominator in (12) is positive.
Therefore, the sign of
@qi;NG
@ki
is determined by the sign of the numerator
in (12). Given that ki; kj 2 (0; 1);both kj(4(1 + k2j ) + k2i (4 + 3k2j )) and
2ki(4 + 3k
2
j )((2  kikj + 2k2j ))) are positive. As a > 0, the numerator in (12)
is negative. As a consequence, we know that
@qi;NG
@ki
< 0.
Proposition 1
Proof. The FOC implies @i;NG
@ki
= 0. Using the implicit function we know
that:
@ki;NG
@a
=  
@(
@i;NG
@ki
)
@a
@(
@i;NG
@ki
)
@ki
and
@ki;NG
@
=  
@(
@i;NG
@ki
)
@
@(
@i;NG
@ki
)
@ki
, (a.1)
or rearranging,
@ki;NG
@a
=  
@i;NG
@ki@a
@2i;NG
@k2i
and
@ki;NG
@
=  
@i;NG
@ki@
@2i;NG
@k2i
: (a.2)
We focus on the combinations of parameters that make the SOC hold
(see footnote 14). This implies that @
2i;NG
@k2i
in (a.2) is negative. Thus, it is
easy to see that
@ki;NG
@a
and
@ki;NG
@
have respectively the same signs as @
2i;NG
@ki@a
and @
2i;NG
@ki@
. Next, we must check the signs of @
2i;NG
@ki@a
and @
2i;NG
@ki@
.
After calculating @
2i;NG
@ki@a
, we substitute ki and kj by k. This yields
@2i;NG
@ki@a
in symmetry, which is negative for any k 2 (0; 1)
@2i;NG
@ki@a

ki=kj=k
=
 4ak(6 + 11k2 + 6k4)
(2 + k2)(2 + 3k2)3
< 0: (a.3)
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On the other hand, @
2i;NG
@ki@
is obviously positive
@2i;NG
@ki@
= 2(1  ki): (a.4)
We therefore know that
@ki;NG
@a
< 0 and
@ki;NG
@
> 0. Therefore, ki;NG is
decreasing in a and increasing in .
Proposition 2
Proof. It is immediate to see that
@x;G;S
@a
=  2k
2(2+k2)
< 0,
@xG;S
@z
= (2+3k
2)
2(2+k2)
> 0
for any k 2 (0; 1). In words, x;G;S is decreasing in a and increasing in z.
Solving xG;S = 0 for a yields a critical value a
cv = 2k
2+2z+3k2z
2k
, above which
xG;S < 0: This critical value is increasing in z. The rest of the proposition
follows.
Lemma 4
@qi;G
@k
evaluated in symmetry can be written as
@qi;G
@k
=  2k2(8+6k2 3k3)+1 2
2(4+8k2+3k4)2
,
where 1 = ak(28+52k2+27k4) and 2 = z(8+20k2+6k4 9k6) : Given that
k lies within the interval (0; 1), it is easy to see that 2 > 0, and therefore
(1 + 2) > 0. As a consequence,
@qi;G
@k
< 0.
Proposition 3
Proof. Using the implicit function theorem, the slope of the function ki (z)
is given by @k

i
@z
=  
@2i;G
@ki@z
@2i;G
@k2
i
. Focusing on the case where a,  and z take values
that guarantee that the SOC for a maximum is met, @
2i;G
@k2i
< 0: Therefore,
the sign of @k

i
@z
depends on the sign of @
2i;G
@ki@z
: If it is positive (negative), then
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@ki
@z
> (<)0. After calculating @
2i;G
@ki@z
, we substitute ki and kj by k, yielding
@2i;G
@ki@z

ki=kj=k
=
a  + z	+ 
2(2 + k2)3(2 + 3k2)2
; (a.5)
where   = ( 16  52k2   52k4   k6 + 15k8), 	 = 16k + 72k3 + 108k5 + 54k7
and  = 24k3+60k5+40k7. It is easy to check that the denominator of @
2i;G
@ki@z
> 0 and therefore, the sign of @
2i;G
@ki@z
depends only on its of the numerator.
Further, it is easy to check that   < 0; 	 > 0 and  > 0 for any k 2 (0; 1).
Solving the equation a + z	+ = 0, we can nd the critical value of z, zcv
above (below) which @
2i;NG
@ki@z
is positive (negative). As a consequence, if z >
(<) zcv,
@ki
@z
> (<)0. This critical value is zcv =   a 	 : As   < 0, it is easy
to check that @zcv
@a
> 0, therefore, the critical value is increasing in a.
Proposition 4
Proof. From Proposition 3 we know that there is a critical value of z, zcv,
above (below) which kG is decreasing (increasing). Further, we know that
kNG does not depend on z, that is, it is constant with respect to z. It follows
from the functional forms of kG and k

NG with respect to z that there 3
possible cases: i) kG and k

NG cross once (in the increasing part of k

G) of ,
ii) kG and k

NG cross twice (once in the increasing and once in the decreasing
part of kG) or iii) k

G is strictly higher than k

NG in the feasible range of z,
z > 0:The critical value zl will be the value of z at which kG and k

NG cross
in the increasing part of kG (cases i and ii) or z = 0 (case iii). Thus, if z > zl,
kG > k

NG.
Lemma 5
Proof. We know that the equilibrium output will be higher if x = 0 than
is if x > 0, given that @q

i
@x
< 0: The output level for x = 0 is equivalent
to the output level in the absence of the environmentalists. It follows that
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qi;G < q

i;NG. Further, recall that the emissions levels in market i are given
by yi = kiqi. Thus, for a given k, higher output implies higher emissions.
The rest of the lemma follows.
Proposition 5
Proof. It follows from the functional forms of kG, k

NG and lemmata 1, 2
and 3.
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CHAPTER 4
Trade union structure with environmental
concern and rmstechnological choice1
1 Introduction
Recently a small but increasing number of social studies recognises the envi-
ronmentalism as a strong motivation which could inuence the trade unions
decisions and strategies. As Obach (1999) reports Starting with the wave
of environmentalism that began in the late 1960s, we see that a number of
unions were supportive of this environmental mobilizationand according to
Silverman (2006) Union environmentalism is based in the particularist pur-
pose of unions to protect members and in their more-universalist purpose to
promote class mobilization based on solidarity. Furthermore, in the litera-
ture there are examples from the real world experience with respect to the
unions environmentalism as well as trade unions alliances with the environ-
mental groups for common targets (e.g. Obach, 1999, 2002, 2004; Rose, 2004
and Mayer, 2009).2
Therefore, the strong evidence for the union environmentalism could
drives the economists to ask How the trade unions could react to the rms
level of pollution when the organised workers participate in the production
1Previous versions of this chapter has been presented in a number of conferences and
workshops like the; Warsaw International Economic Meeting 2010, and Irish Society of
New Economists 2010, and 21st PhD workshop on International Climate policy 2010.
Therefore, I would like to thank the audience for their useful comments and discussion
as well as Svetlana Batrakova, Ron Davies and Tom Weyman - Jones for their helpful
comments.
2An other important evidence for the interest of the labour community for
the environmental protection is the document from the United Nations Environ-
mental Program (UNEP) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) un-
der the title Labour and the Environment: A Natural Synergy. Available at
http://www.unep.org/labour_environment/PDFs/UNEP-labour-env-synergy.pdf
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process? How the unions environmental interest could inuence the rmsde-
cision for the technological choice, the level of the production and the prots?
What will happen to the unionswages and utility? Which unions structure
could provide the lower level of emissions? The aim of this research is to
explore and to shed more light on the previous issues.
In the economic literature the inuence of the trade union structures
on the rms technological choice is a main research issue in labour and
technological economics and has been analysed extensively.3 However, both
empirical and theoretical studies have given ambiguous results with respect to
the dimensions of the unionisations inuence on rmstechnology, innovation
or R&D. For example a strong negative relation has been reported in North
America between the unionisation and innovation but the European studies
have not conrmed this strong relation (e.g. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen,
2003; Haucap and Wey, 2004 and Manasakis and Petrakis, 2009).
In this paper, following the recent theoretical studies on oligopoly, union
structure and innovation, I explore the rmstechnological choice under the
case of decentralised unions (independent union for each rm) and centralised
union (industry-wide union) in a Cournot market. However, contrary to the
literature, I introduce the case of the unions direct interest for environmen-
tal protection, which has been neglected, although it is an essential issue for
environmental economics and policy.4 I show that, the decentralised struc-
ture could always provide higher incentives to the rms for the adoption of
a better (less polluting) technology. Also, although rms prefer the decen-
tralised unionisation (because the prots are higher) than the centralised,
3For some examples see Ulph and Ulph, 1998 and Dobson, 1994 and for a survey see
Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003.
4Also, for the relation between the unionised workers and the application of the envi-
ronmental policy see for example Stavins, 1998 and Fredriksson and Gaston, 1999. Fur-
thermore, in the literature there are cases where the unions opposed to the environmental
policies under the threat of higher unemployment. However, it is less interesting to focus
on the case of trade unions without environmental interest given that already exists in the
literature.
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the unions prefer the industry-wide union case (where the unions utility is
higher). Furthermore, the level of the rmsemissions depends on the size
of the market, therefore, it could be lower under the centralised structure
(compared the decentralised) for relatively small market size. Therefore, this
study on the one hand, could partially cover the gap in the literature with
respect to the environmental issue and the role of the trade unions. On the
other hand, may encourage further theoretical and empirical investigation
for the relation between the union structure, the environmental issue and
the technological choice or innovation.
The model is based on a duopolistic market where rms compete à la
Cournot and both rms are unionised. In the same spirit, Ulph and Ulph
(1989) use a duopolistic model where each rm faces an independent union.
In their model the rms participate in a patent race to gain a new technol-
ogy (tournament model) where only one rm could use the new technology
(innovator). They conclude that the strength of the union and the timing of
the rms-unions negotiations could discourage the rmsincentives for R&D
investment. Also in a similar study, Ulph and Ulph (1994) compare the Right
to Manage case (bargaining over wages) with the E¢ cient Bargaining case
(bargaining over wages and employment). In this model however, like in the
previous, there are only decentralised unions and the rms participate on a
tournament race for a labour-saving technology where only one rm could
be the innovator.
Also Tauman and Weiss (1987) following a Cournot market, consider the
role of the unionisation on the rmsdecision for the adoption of labour-
saving technology. In their model two rms; one unionised and the second
non-unionised, compete in the product market as well as in the tournament
race. The authors conclude that the unionised rm has more incentives to
adopt a new technology in order to defend against higher costs (wages) from
the unionised workers. However they assume that only one rm is unionised.
Additionally, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) focus on the struc-
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ture of the union -centralised and decentralised- and the inuence on the
rmstechnological choice for labour-saving technology. The authors follow-
ing the Right to Manage bargaining model, analyse three possible technolog-
ical choices; only one rm innovates, both rms innovate, both rms choose
not to innovate. They conclude that the centralisation may provide stronger
incentives to the rms for innovation, but this argument is strong under a
small market size. In their model there are only two possible levels of tech-
nologies; the old and the new, but the rms face a linear cost function. Con-
trary to Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), I assume the existence of a
spectrum of available technologies where the rmscost function is quadratic.
Furthermore, Haucap and Wey (2004) analyse three possible union struc-
tures. Specically, they consider the case of the decentralised unions, the case
of the coordinationwhere the single union sets individual wages (wages
discrimination) to each rm and nally the centralised union where there
is only one wage (uniform) for all rms in the industry. The rms com-
pete in R&D tournament race for a labour-saving technology. They show
that the rmsincentives for investment or innovation are larger under the
centralisation. Also the decentralised case encourages more innovation than
coordination. Moreover, decentralisation o¤ers higher levels of employment
to the unions than coordination where centralisation o¤ers a lower employ-
ment level. Therefore, the innovation incentives are non-monotone in the
degree of the centralisation. In their article, as in Ulph and Ulph (1989,
1994), the model is based on a patent race for labour-saving technology and
with one innovator.
Recently, Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) explore the incentives of the
rms to invest on cost-reducing R&D under di¤erent union structure. The
authors compare the R&D investment with the presence of the R&D spillovers
when the two rms do not cooperate in technology and when they cooperate
under the form of Research Joint Ventures (RJV). They argue that if the
spillovers are low and under the absence of the cooperation, the centralised
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union (with uniform wage) encourages more R&D investment than the de-
centralised structure. Besides, in the case of the RJV the incentives for R&D
investment are always higher under the decentralisation structure than under
the industry-wide union. However, in my study I focus on the case without
the existence of the spillovers and on the use of the environmental technology.
The previous papers, except the technical di¤erences and characteristics
with this study, have neglected the environmental issue and as a result the
unionsreaction against pollution and their possible inuence on the rms
anti-pollution technological choice. Specically, I assume that both rms
are unionised. Like in Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), I compare the
decentralised with the centralised structure (wage discrimination). The rms
compete in the output market only and both can adopt an environmental
(anti-polluting) technology from a spectrum of available technologies. Also
the union(s)utility function is characterised by the environmental concern
because the unionsmay have a degree of environmentalismor because the
unionised workers would be harmed from the rmsemissions.5
Following the timing of the game from Haucap and Wey (2004), the rms
decision for the technological choice, which is a long run decision, is included
in the rst stage. Then the rms negotiate with the union(s) for the wages,
which could happen in a shorter time and nally in the third stage the
rms choose output, a much shorter periods decision. I solve the game
by backwards induction to analyse the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE).
I analyse two possible structure of the markets. In the rst case I present
a model with one rm (monopoly) and one trade union (central). This is the
basic version of the model where I introduce the trade unions environmental
interest under the absence of a di¤erent union structure and market struc-
ture. In the second case I extend the basic model in order to focus on the
5For example, the CO2 emissions from the rms could inuence negatively the workers
health.
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Cournot competition between two rms when the trade unions could charac-
terised by a decentralised structure (two rms and two unions) or centralised
structure (two rms and one union). Therefore, the next section includes the
solution of the model under the monopoly case. The section three incudes
the model for the Cournot duopoly competition with the two possible cases
of union structure; the decentralised and centralised. The results from the
two Cournot cases are compared in the section 4. Finally discussion and
conclusions are in section 5.
2 The model - Monopoly market
Following Grout (1984) and Van der Ploeg (1987) I consider a model with
two players; one rm and one trade union. A monopolistic rm faces a linear
inverse demand function p = a  q where a > 0 is the size of the market and
q > 0 is the rms level of production. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
only cost for the rm is the labour cost and the cost for the technological
choice. Therefore, the rms cost function is given by
C = wL+ (1  k)2 (1)
where w and L is the level of the organised workerswages and employment
respectively. Also, it is assumed that the rm produces with constant returns
to scale, so, L = q. Additionally, k indicates the rms environmental tech-
nological choice where k 2 (0; 1].14 Thus, the lower the value of k (close to
0) the less polluting the technology is, where the quadratic form represents
the diminishing returns to investment. Additionally, the less polluting the
technology is the higher the technological cost for the rm and the para-
meter  > 0 increases the technological cost for the adoption of a greener
technology. Then, the rms prots equation equals
14Following the real markets it is assumed that k 6= 0. So, there is not available the
technology which can reduce the emissions equal to zero.
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 = pq   C (2)
The centralised trade union (monopolistic union) sets the level of the
wages according to RTM model. The union is characterised by a risk-averse
utility, thus, the union cares equal for the size of the wages (w) and for
the level of the employment (L). Also, it is assumed that the workers are
homogeneous with the same probability of being employed, and the wage
which they could gain from a competitive industry (or reservation wage) is
equal to zero. Furthermore, the trade union reacts against a damage function
(or to the workersdisutility from the rms emissions)15 which is D = ey.16
In this case, e is the damage parameter (e.g. the environmental damage
for each tonne of CO2) and y is the level of the pollution which depends
on the rms technological choice and the level of production, (y = kq).
Simply, on the one hand, the greener the rms technological choice the
lower the level of the pollution is, but on the other hand, the higher the
production is, more pollution will released to the environment. Therefore,
the unions utility function after the introduction of the damage equation is
U = wL  ey = wL  ekq.
Without loss of generality and in favour of the simplicity some restriction
on the possible spectrum of the optimum results are necessary
conditions: a > e, 16 > e2, 16 > ae and ae2 < 8(a+ e)
2.1 Stage three: Firm decides on the output
After some algebraic manipulations the rms prot equation is
 = (a  q)q   wq   (1  k)2 (3)
15See also Eshel and Sexon, 2009.
16For a linear damage or constant marginal damage function see Kennedy (1999) and
Requate (2005). Under a more general damage function (e.g. quadratic) the results are
more complex and ambiguous.
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where the First Order Condition (FOC) becomes 17
@
@q
= a  2q   w = 0 (4)
thus, the equilibrium level of output and employment is
q = L =
a  w
2
(5)
and as usual the level of the production is decreasing in the level of the wages
and is increasing in the size of the market.
2.2 Stage two: Union sets wages
In this stage the union decides the level of the wages according to the util-
ity function which after the substitution of the previous equilibrium output
becomes
U = wL   ekq = 1
2
(a  w)(w   ek) (6)
therefore, the FOC is @U

@w
= 1
2
(a+ek 2w) = 0 and the SOC is @2U
@w2
=  1 < 0.
Solving the FOC with respect to the wages, the equilibrium wages set by the
union is given by
w =
1
2
(a+ ek) (7)
and as we can observe the more polluting the rms technological choice
(higher values of k) the higher is the level of the wages demanded by the
union. Simply, the decreasing returns to investment drive the rm to gain
more returns from the adoption of a dirty technology (rather than from a
green technology) and the unions due to the rent seeking approach set higher
wages.
Proposition 6 The level of wages is increasing the more polluting is the
technological choice.
17The Second Order Condition (SOC) is fullled.
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2.3 Stage one: Firm chooses technology
From the substitution of (7) to (5) the equilibrium level of output (or em-
ployment) becomes q = 1
4
(a   ek) where @q
@k
< 0. Thus, the greener (less
polluting) the rms technological choice is, the larger the production. So,
the rm in order to produce more needs a less polluting technology. Further-
more, in this stage the rms prots are  = (q)2   (k   1)2 and from
the FOC the optimum technological choice is18
k =
ae  16
e2   16 (8)
which is positive under the conditions of this model and is decreasing in the
size of the market, @k
@a
< 0. Hence, increases in the markets size drives the
rm to adopt a less polluting (greener) technology.
Proposition 7 The technology is decreasing (less polluting) in the size of
the market.
Actually, the explanation for this proposition emanates from the increas-
ing output under the increase on the markets size @q

@a
> 0 which implies
the adoption of a greener technology in order to produce more, @q

@k
< 0.
Additionally, a typical result with respect to the technological choice is that
the rm will adopt a better (less polluting) technology under the decreasing
of the adoption cost or the parameter , (@k
@
> 0).
After the necessary substitutions the optimum levels of output and wages
respectively are
q = L =
4(a  e)
16   e2 (9)
w =
8(a+ e)   ae2
16   e2 (10)
18The SOC is negative.
99
where @q
@a
> 0 and @q
@
< 0. Furthermore, there is a critical value of the damage
parameter (ecv = a  
p
a2   16) according to which the @q
@e
< 0 (@L
@e
< 0)
for 0 < e < ecv and
@q
@e
> 0 (@L
@e
> 0) for ecv < e < a. That is, there is a
U-shape relation between the optimum output and the damage parameter.
Besides, the same critical value of the damage parameter ecv determines the
relation between w and e. Particularly, if 0 < e < ecv then @w@e > 0 and if
ecv < e < a then @w@e < 0. Hence, an inverse U-shape curve characterises the
relation between the damage parameter and the optimum level of wages.
Proposition 8 The same critical value of the damage parameter determines
i) a U-shape relation between the optimum output (or employment) and the
value of the damage parameter, ii) an inverse U-shape relation between the
optimum level of wages and the value of the damage parameter.
The explanation behind this is that; on the one hand, the increasing of
the damage parameter up to the critical value (e < ecv) drives the union to
set higher level of wages because the damage to the environment is increasing
(D = ey). Then, for the rm, the higher labour cost drives to a lower level
of production and less workers (@q

@w
= @L

@w
< 0). On the other hand, the
union cares for the level of the employment. Thus, for values of the damage
parameter higher than the critical value (ecv < e) the union will reduce the
level of the demanded wages. So, the labour cost is decreasing, the rm will
hire more workers and produce more.
The rms prots and the unions utility are positive and are given by
the expressions respectively:
 =
(a  e)2
16   e2 (11)
U =
32(a  e)22
(e2   16)2 (12)
Finally, the equilibrium level of emissions is equal
100
y =
4(a+ e)(16   ae)
(e2   16) (13)
where the derivative with respect to the markets size is @y
@a
= 4(e
2 2ae+16)
(e2 16)2
which is positive for a < acv and negative for a > acv, given that acv =
e2+16
2e
is the critical value of markets size. Simply, there is an inverse U-shape
relation between y and a.
Proposition 9 The relation between the optimum level of pollution and the
size of the market is characterised by an inverse U-shape relation.
The reason for the previous proposition is the existence of two e¤ects.
Specically, the rm will produce more under the increasing of the markets
size, so will pollute more (rst e¤ect). However, the rm will adopt a less
polluting technology in order to produce more, so the level of the pollution
is decreasing (second e¤ect). Thus, for a < acv the rst e¤ect dominates the
second and for the opposite case the opposite holds.
3 The model - Cournot duopoly market
The model is made as simple as possible in order to focus on the e¤ect of the
unions structure on the level of the emissions. Therefore, I consider a classic
Cournot oligopoly model with two unionised rms indicated by i; j = 1; 2
with i 6= j and a homogeneous product. Following the usual assumption the
rms produce with constant returns to scale qi = Li where qi; Li is the rms
i output and labour respectively. The price in the product market (inverse
demand function) is given by p = a   qi   qj where a > 0 is the size of the
market. Also ki 2 (0; 1] is the level of the rms i anti-pollution technology
which is more e¢ cient against the pollution (cleaner or greener) for values
close to 0 and less e¢ cient (dirtier or browner) for values near to 1. Like in
the real market, I assume the absence of the perfect technology which can
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stop all the emissions from the production. Therefore, ki > 0. Furthermore,
following Asproudis and Gil-Molto (2009) the technological cost is quadratic,
reects the diminishing returns to investment and is equal to (1 ki)2. Also
the parameter  > 0 implies that the adoption of a less polluting (greener)
technology involves higher cost to the rms than the adoption of a more
polluting (browner) technology. For the sake of simplicity and without loss
of generality, I assume that rms do not incur any other production costs.
Thus, the total cost for the rm i becomes Ci = wiLi + (1  ki)2, where wi
is the level of the wages set by the union to the rm i. That is, the rms
prots are given by
i = pqi   Ci (14)
Besides, the unions will set the level of the wages and then the rms
have the right to decide the level of employment according to the Right
to Manage model.6 Furthermore, I start from the usual utility equation
Ui = wiLi (see Oswald, 1985; Booth, 1995 and Dobson, 1994) and from the
assumption that, the unions have total power to set wages but the rms
have the bargaining power to decide the number of workers (e.g. Manasakis
and Petrakis, 2009).78 Additionally, I assume that the reservation wage or
the wage that the workers could gain in a competitive industry is equal to
zero (e.g. Lommerud et al., 2005; Mukherjee et al., 2007 and Manasakis
and Petrakis, 2009). Finally, I hypothesize that each union cares for the
environmental protection (or for the unionised membershealth which could
be harmed from the rmspollution) and reacts against the rms emissions.
Hence each trade union objective is to reduce the level of the environmental
6For some studies with respect to the Right to Manage model see Nickell and Andrews,
1983; Espinoza and Rhee, 1989; Lopez and Naylor, 2004 and Mukherjee, 2008.
7This is the Monopoly Union model (Dunlop, 1944) a special case of the Right to
Manage model. See also Oswald, 1982 and 1985 and Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004.
8Another usual assumption is that all the workers are organised members, they are
homogeneous and they have equal opportunity to be employees (e.g. Oswald, 1985).
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damage (through the rms damage function) which emanates from the rms
pollution.9 For the rm i the damage equation or the workers disutility
from the pollution (see Eshel and Sexton, 2009) is equal to Di(yi) = eyi, an
increasing function of the emissions. Also, e is the damages parameter for
each unit of emissions or pollution (e.g. the environmental damage for each
tonne of CO2), therefore the marginal damage with respect to the emissions
is constant.10 Also, given that k > 0 then always e > 0. The yi indicates
rms i level of emissions where yi = kiqi. Thus, each rms level of emissions
depends on the greennessof the technology and the level of production. So,
I introduce the damage function in the trade unions utility function and
therefore the equation becomes Ui = wiLi  D = wiLi   eyi.
I explore two possible structures of the unions. In the rst case there is one
union for each rm, the decentralised case, where initially the rms choose
technology simultaneously. Then, the unions set the wages simultaneously
following a sequential Right to Manage bargaining model and nally the rms
decide simultaneously on production (and employment).11 The last stage is
common with the second case where there is only one union, the centralised
union, which will set wages for both rms.
There are some common conditions for the two models, which are neces-
sary in order to be sure that the results are the optima and to be compared
under the same spectrum of values.
Conditions: a > e; 9 > e2; 14:46 > ae; ae2 < 4:82(a + 2e); ae2 <
9(a+ e)
9A possible extension of this approach is the case where each union cares for the total
level of the emissions or the emissions at industry level, then each union will deal with the
total damage function or the damage which emanates from the pollution of both rms.
10For linear damage or constant marginal damage function see Kennedy (1999), Kennedy
and Laplante (1999) and Requate (2005). An other possible extension of the model is the
using of a quadratic damage equation. However, the results are much more ambiguous
and complex.
11In Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) the unions bargain simultaneously with the
rms over the wages. In my model the bargaining is sequential, so the union(s) set the
wages and then the rms decide for the level of the employment (or output).
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3.1 Stage three: Firms decide on the output
After some manipulations the rmsprots equations become
i = (a  qi   qj)qi   wiqi   (ki   1)2 (15)
where following the standard calculation of the First Order Condition (FOC)
each rms reaction function becomes qRFi = (a   qj   wi)=2. Solving si-
multaneously the equations of the reaction functions the Cournot - Nash
equilibrium output, employment and prots respectively are given by
qi = L

i =
a  2wi + wj
3
;
i = (q

i )
2   (ki   1)2 (16)
Note that the equilibrium output is decreasing in its rms wage but is in-
creasing in the rivals rm level of wage and as usual is increasing in the size
of the market.
This stage is common stage for the two possible union structure, decen-
tralised and centralised. In the next subsection I analyse the model for the
case of the decentralisation where each rm will bargain with one union over
the wages.
3.2 Decentralised unions
3.2.1 Stage two: Unions set wages
In this stage the two unions will move together and will set the level of the
wages for each rm (bargaining at the rm level). For the decentralised case
the unionsutility is given by
UDi = wiLi   eyi (17)
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and after the substitution of the equilibrium output (and employment) the
utility function becomes UDi = (wi   eki)qi . From the calculation the FOC
I obtain12
@UDi
@wi
=
1
3
(a+ 2eki   4wi + wj) = 0 (18)
where @
2UDi
@wi@wj
> 0, thus, the wages are strategic complements. Like in Petrakis
and Vlassis (2004) if the union j set higher wages to rm j the level of the
output from the specic rm will reduce (
@qj
@wj
< 0) but rm i will produce
more ( @q

i
@wj
< 0). So it becomes more attractive for the union i to set higher
wages to rms i when the rival rm deals with higher wages from the union
j.13
Solving simultaneously the FOCs the equilibrium wage is14
wDi =
1
15
(5a+ 2e(4ki + kj)) (19)
where the level of the wage setting from each union depends positively on
the rmsdecision for the greenness of the technological choice. Simply, the
better (with less emissions) the technology adopted by both rms, the less
will be, the level of the wages demanded by the unions.15
Proposition 10 The more polluting the rmstechnology (at industry level)
is, the higher the level of the wages demanded by the unions.
12The SOC is  4=3, therefore the utility function is a risk-averse utility (@2UDi =@wD
2
i <
0, see also Booth, 1995).
13For example, the union i will set higher wages when the union j set higher wages to
the rm j. Then the rm i may produce the same output as before the increasing of the
rival rms level of wages (rm j). So the number of the workers in rm i could be the
same but with higher wages, which means that the rm i nally maybe will not produce
more but will pay for higher wages.
14It is interesting to observe that, solving the FOC with respect to the wage the reaction
function of the unions will be wRFi =
1
4 (a+ 2eki + wj). Hence, each union will decide for
the level of the wage taking into account the other unions decision for the wage.
15The wages are increasing due to the rent-seeking behavior. The union seeks higher
level of wages when the rms returns from an investment become higher.
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3.2.2 Stage one: Firms choose technology
In this stage the rms will decide on the level of technology given the de-
centralised unionsdecisions for the level of wages. After the substitution of
(19) to (16); the equilibrium output, employment and prots respectively are
equal to
qDi = L
D
i =
2
45
(5a  7eki + 2ekj);
Di = (q
D
i )
2   (ki   1)2 (20)
Also note that, on the one hand, the equilibrium output is decreasing in its
rms technological choice (@q
D
i
@ki
< 0). Thus, the production is increasing
if the rm adopts a greener technology. On the other hand, the equilibrium
output for each rm is increasing in the rival rms technological choice
(
@qDi
@kj
> 0). Hence, the output is increasing if the rival rm chooses a dirty
than if will adopt a greentechnology.
From the equilibrium prots I calculate the derivative with respect to the
technology and solving these equations simultaneously, I obtain the rms
optimum technological choice16
k
D
i =
ae  14:46
e2   14:46 (21)
where the optimum technology is positive given the necessary conditions
of the model. Also, given that k
D
i is decreasing in the size of the market
(@k
D
i
@a
< 0), this implies that the bigger the markets size, the greener (less
polluting) the adopted technology is. Actually, the increasing of the market
will raise the production of the rms (@q
D
i
@a
> 0) but this implies the adoption
of a better technology (@q
D
i
@ki
< 0). Furthermore, the optimum technology
16The FOC is @

i
@ki
=   2(140ae+2025(ki 1)+28e2(2kj 7ki))2025 and the SOC is @
2i
@k2i
= 392e
2
2025  
2 which is negative given the conditions of the model.
106
is decreasing in the parameter  or as usual, the increasing adoption costs
discourage the rmsto adopt a better technology (@k
D
i
@
> 0).
Thus, after the necessary substitutions the optimum prots are

D
i =
784(a  e)2(10:33   e2)
(28e2   405)2 (22)
and the optimum output and employment is
qDi = L
D
i =
3:21(a  e)
14:46   e2 (23)
Therefore the level of the emissions from each rm is given by
yDi =
2520(a  e)(14:46   ae)
(28e2   405)2 (24)
Interestingly, the derivative of the emissions with respect to the size of the
market @y
D
i
@a
could be positive or negative but depends on the markets size.
Specically, there is a critical value for the size of the market aDcv =
e2+14:46
2e
according to which for a < aDcv the emissions are increasing in the size of
the market @y
D
i
@a
> 0 and for the opposite case the opposite holds. The
intuition for this is the existence of the two e¤ects. Particularly, on the
one hand the increase in the markets size drives the rms to produce more
(
@qDi
@a
> 0), hence, the level of the emissions becomes higher (direct e¤ect).
On the other hand, under the increase of the markets size (and the rise of the
production) the rms will adopt a better (less polluting) technology because
then the production is rising, (@k
D
i
@a
< 0 and @q
D
i
@ki
< 0). Thus, the level of
the emissions is reducing (indirect e¤ect). That is, for size of the market less
than the critical value the rst e¤ect dominates the second. However for size
of the market larger than the critical value the second e¤ect dominates the
rst. Diagrammatically, an inverse U-shape could characterise the level of
the emissions with the size of the market.
Proposition 11 There is an inverse U-shape curve between the level of pol-
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lution and the size of the market.
Furthermore the wages for each union will be
wDi =
4:82(a+ 2e)   ae2
14:46   e2 (25)
where each unions optimum utility becomes
U
D
i =
12150(a  e)22
(28e2   405)2 (26)
3.3 Centralised unions
3.3.1 Stage two: Union sets wages
In the case of the centralised union, only one union, the central union, set
wages
UC = wiLi + wjLj   e(yi + yj) (27)
and after the substitution of the equilibrium output the utility equation is
equal to UC = (wi   eki)qi + (wj   ekj)qj , so the FOC is17
@UCi
@wi
=
1
3
(a+ 2eki   ekj   4wi + 2wj) (28)
and the Nash equilibriumwages after the simultaneously solving for the FOCs
will become
wCi =
1
2
(a+ eki) (29)
where similar to the decentralised case, the level of the wages under cen-
tralisation depends positively on the rms technology but contrary to the
decentralised structure depends only on each rms level of technology and
not on the both rmstechnological choice.
17Again the SOC is  4=3, so risk-averse utility.
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Proposition 12 The wage set by the union is increasing in each rms tech-
nological choice.
3.3.2 Stage one: Firms choose technology
After the substitution of the previous centralised equilibrium values in qi ; L

i ;

i
the rmsoutput, employment and prots respectively, are:
qCi = L
C
i =
1
6
(a  2eki + ekj);
Ci = (q
D
i )
2   (ki   1)2 (30)
where, like in the case of decentralisation, the equilibrium output (or em-
ployment) is decreasing in ki and increasing in kj. Again solving the system
of the equations from the FOCs, the rms optimum technological choice for
the case of the centralised union is18
k
C
i =
ae  18
e2   18 (31)
Again, the rmstechnological choice under the unionised structure is de-
creasing in the size of the market (@k
C
i
@a
< 0), so it becomes greener and is
rising in the parameter  (@k
C
i
@
> 0), thus, it becomes more polluting. Hence,
after the substitution of the optimum technology to the protsequation, the
optimum prots under the centralised union are

C
i =
(a  e)2(9   e2)
(e2   18)2 (32)
18The FOCs are equal @
C
i
@ki
= 19 ( ae   18(ki   1) + e2(2ki   kj)) also the SOC is
@2Ci
@k2i
= 29 (e
2   9) which is negative given the initial conditions of the model.
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and the output (and employment) equilibrium is
qCi =
3(a  e)
18   e2 (33)
therefore each rms level of emissions is
yCi =
3(a  e)(18   ae)
(e2   18)2 (34)
and like in the case of decentralisation, the optimum level of emissions have
an inverse U-shape relation with the size of the market, where the critical
value now is aCcv =
e2+18
2e
. Therefore, there are two e¤ects; the increasing
of the emissions which emanate from the increasing of the output and the
reduction of the emissions which originating from the adoption of a better,
less-polluting, technology. Again, the level of the optimum emissions is in-
creasing for markets size less than the critical size (rst e¤ect dominates
the second) and is decreasing for marketssize larger than the critical value
(second e¤ect dominates the rst). Also, the wages from each rm will be
wCi =
9(a+ e)   ae2
18   e2 (35)
and the unions utility equal to:
U
C
i =
54(a  e)22
(e2   18)2 (36)
4 Comparison
In this section I will compare the optimum results from the two cases. It is
necessary to note that the results are positive for the given conditions of the
models.
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4.1 Firmsoutput (employment) and wages
Lets start from the rmsoutput (or employment). For the decentralised
case the rmsoutput is qDi and for the centralised is q
C
i where the q
D
i >
qCi . Then, the level of the production under the bargaining at the rms
level is higher than under the single industry-wide union bargaining.19 From
the employeesviewpoint the level of the employment is higher under the
decentralised structure than under centralisation which is a typical result in
the case of the bargaining over wages (RTM).
Moreover, another typical result is the higher level of wages under central-
isation compared to the decentralisation structure (wCi > w
D
i ).
20 However,
the unions are characterised by a risk-averse utility, thus, they care for the
number of employees (which is the same with the output) as well as for the
level of the wages. These objectives are obvious through the use of com-
parative statics. Specically, under decentralisation there is the same critical
value of the damage parameter eDcv =
1
14
(14a p7
p
28a2   405) for the case
of the optimum decentralised wages and output (employment). Particularly,
for 0 < e < eDcv, the optimum wages are increasing but the optimum output
is decreasing in the parameter e and for eDcv < e < a the wages are decreasing
and the production (or employment) is increasing in e.21 Simply there is an
inverse U-shape relation between wages and the damage parameter and a
U-shape between output (employment) and the parameter e as it is shown
in the next gures.
19After the calculation of the di¤erence between qDi   qCi and solving with respect to
e2= the result is qDi > q
C
i if e
2= < 67:5 but from the conditions e2= is always less than
9, thus the decentralised optimum output is higher than the centralised output.
20The centralisation gives more bargaining power to the union to set higher wages as a
monopolist in the labour market.
21For the case of the decentralisation the derivatives of the optimum output and wages
with respect to damage parameters respectively are @q
D
i
@e =
90(56ae 28e2 405)
(28e2 405)2 ;
@wDi
@e =
270(28e2 56ae+405)
(28e2 405)2 . Also for the case of the centralisation the critical values of the damage
parameter is eCcv = a 
p
a2   18.
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Figure 3: U-shape between q and e
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Figure 4: Inverse U-shape between w and e
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The intuition behind this is that, on the one hand the increasing of the
damage parameter for values less than the critical drives the unions to set
higher wages but then the rms in order to deal with the higher labour costs,
will produce less ( @q

i
@wi
< 0). Hence the level of employment is reduced. On
the other hand, the unions in order to raise the number of employees (under
the threat of higher unemployment) and for values of the damage parameter
higher than the critical, will reduce the level of wages. Then the rms will
gain from the lower labour cost and will produce more, thus the level of the
employment is increasing.22
22See also Booth (1995) for more detail analysis on the unionspossible utilities.
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Proposition 13 a) The output (employment) is higher under the decen-
tralised structure than under the centralised but the wages are higher under
the centralised structure. b) The optimum wages and output (employment)
are characterised by an inverse U-shape and an ordinary U-shape relation
respectively with respect to the values of the damage parameter.
4.2 Prots and unionsutility
Also the rmsprots are higher under decentralisation than under the cen-
tralised case. Therefore 
D
i > 
C
i for each e
2 < 9.23 So, according to the
results, the rms prefer bargaining over the wages with the unions at rm
level rather than under the single centralised union.
However the unionised structure o¤ers higher level of utility to the union
(or to the organised workers) than the decentralised structure. Specically,
U
C
i > U
D
i so, in this case, the unions have reasons to prefer one, single and
centralised union, than two di¤erent unions, in order to bargain with the
rms for the level of wages.
Proposition 14 The rms prefer the decentralised structure where the prof-
its are more but the unions prefer the centralised structure where the utility
is higher.
4.3 Technology and emissions
After some necessary calculations I obtain that the decentralised optimum
technology k
D
i is always lower than the centralised optimum technological
choice k
C
i for the given common conditions of the two models. Therefore the
rmstechnological choice under the decentralised unions is greener than the
optimum technology under the case of the single union.
23The decentralised prots are higher than the centralised for e2= < 44:05 but from
the conditions e2= < 9.
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Proposition 15 The rmstechnological choice is more green- less polluting-
under decentralisation than under the industry-wide union.
Actually the centralised structure, with wage discrimination, discourages
the rms to adopt a better technology and they prefer a more polluting
technology. Therefore, any movement, or change in the institutions of the
labour market, from decentralisation to centralisation will drive the rms to
adopt a worse (more polluting) technology.
Additionally, I compare the level of the emissions from each rm under
the case of the decentralised and centralised union structure. Interestingly,
the result depends on the size of the market. In particular, for markets size
less than 35A=eB where A = (501:62   e2(e2 + 14:86)) and B = (e3(e  
135)+1930; 9e2), the level of the emissions under the centralised structure
is less than under the decentralised. However, for size of the market higher
than 35A=eB; the emissions are lower under decentralisation compared to
the emissions from the cenralised case. Thus, for relatively low markets size,
the pollution at industry level is lower under the industry-wide union and for
the opposite case the opposite holds.
Proposition 16 The level of the emissions is lower under the centralised
union than under the decentralised for relatively low markets size. For rela-
tively higher markets size (higher than 35A=eB) the decentralised structure
provides the lower level of emissions.
4.4 Simulations
In this subsection I calibrate the results in order to focus on the inuence of
the markets size on the level of the rmsemissions. Specically, for the same
and given values of the parameter e and  a small change in the markets
size can change signicantly the optimum results. In the next two tables
are included the numerical results for the case of the two union structure
(decentralised and centralised) when the size of the market changes from 7
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to 6 and for values of damage parameter equal to 4 and for parameter  equal
to 2. 24
Table 5: Simulations under relatively small size of the market
a = 6, e = 4,  = 2 Decentralised Centralised
k 0.38 0.6
q 0.99 0.6
 0.22 0.04
y 0.379 0.36
w 0.3 4.2
U 1.48 2.16
Table 6: Simulations under relatively large size of the market
a = 7, e = 4,  = 2 Decentralised Centralised
k 0.07 0.4
q 1.49 0.9
 0.50 0.09
y 0.107 0.36
w 2.52 4.3
U 3.33 4.86
It is obvious that for relatively small markets size (table 5, a = 6), un-
der the centralised structure the level of the emissions (y = 0:36) is lower
than under the decentralised case (y = 0:379). However, in the second case
(table 6) where the size of the market is larger than before (a = 7), under
decentralisation the rms will pollute less than under the centralised struc-
ture. Therefore, if the only objective of the decision maker is the reduction
of the emissions, then he prefers di¤erent union structure, according to the
size of the market. Hence, if it is possible to change the institutions in the
labour market, then the regulator prefers any change from large markets
24The specic values can satisfy the conditions of the two models.
115
size to small to be accompanied with a transformation from decentralised to
centralised union structure.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper I have examined how the di¤erent union structures (centralised
and decentralised) could inuence the rms environmental technological
choice when the unions care for environmental protection. Specically, I
assume that the unions focus not only on the level of wages and employment
but also on the reduction of the emissions which emanate from the rms
production as a by-product result.
I analyse two possible markets structure; a monopoly market and an
oligopoly market (duopoly) where the rms compete à la Cournot. The
duopoly version is essential in order to check the robustness of the results
under the case of di¤erent trade unionsstructure. Specically, the results
with respect to the rmsprotability and unionswages reconrm the the-
oretical and empirical results from previous studies. Particularly, the survey
from Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) expressly describes the previous
argument Unions have a clear positive e¤ect on wages and a clear negative
e¤ect on protabilityp.26. Additionally, the centralised (higher unionisa-
tion) structure, compared to the decentralised, discourages the rmsadop-
tion (or innovation) of a better technology. This result agrees with the anal-
ogous results from the North America studies (see Menezes-Filho and Van
Reenen, 2003).
Moreover, in addition to the literature, I focus on the trade unionsstruc-
tures e¤ect on the level of the emissions. I argue that, the centralisation
could lead to lower level of pollution compared to the decentralisation for
relatively low size of the market. However, for relatively higher markets
size the decentralised structure could reduce the level of the rmspollution
more than the centralised case. This issue has been neglected by the empiri-
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cal and theoretical studies (according to my knowledge) and therefore further
investigation may be reasonable.
Besides, there are some interesting characteristics which are common un-
der a monopoly or Cournot duopoly markets style. Concretely, there is an
inverse U-shape relation between i) the level of pollution and the size of the
market and between ii) the optimum wages and the damage parameter. Also,
a U-shape exists between the optimum output (employment) and the value
of the damage parameter. Furthermore, the union(s) set(s) higher level of
wages the more polluting the rms technology is.
Finally, if the regulators objective is the reduction of the rmspollution
then, he prefers a change in the union structure from decentralised to cen-
tralised, when the size of the market is relatively small. However for large
markets size, the decentralisation is preferable with respect to the environ-
mental protection.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
The aim of this research is the presentation and analysis of the inu-
ence of environmental groups and trade unions on the environmental quality
through the economic approach. Hence, the environmental policy may have
some alliances or supporters in the real market, which can accelerate the e¢ -
ciency of these policies. The specic two groups could interact with the rms
given that the groupsactions for environmental protection could inuence
the rmsproduction and decisions and nally the level of the pollution which
emanates from the rmsproduction of goods. Initially, the environmental
groups and the trade unions care for the environmental protection and this
interest becomes one objective for the groups. However, the groups through
the use of di¤erent tools (or mechanism) could inuence the rmstechno-
logical choice in order to press the rms to adopt a better -less polluting-
technology. For example, the environmental groups participate in the trad-
able permits market in order to purchase and withdraw permits because they
believe that with this strategy they can press the rm to adopt a greener
technology. In addition, the trade unions could care for the environmental
protection (or for the protection of the unionised workers from the rms
pollution) therefore, through the bargain with the rms for the level of the
wages and/or the number of the workers, the union can inuence the rms
technological choice and thus, the level of the pollution.
Although the environmental groups and the trade unions have di¤erent
strategies or tools for the reaction against to the environmental pollution,
they have the common interest for the environmental protection. This inter-
est connects the two groups since the beginning of the environmental move-
ment and this interest drives the two groups to create alliances or coalitions
between them for a better environmental quality. However, the two groups
have more targets or objectives than the environmental protection and these
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targets could interact between each other. For example, the trade unions
prefer less pollution and higher wages but it is possible that if the rms
will adopt a less-polluting technology then this may reduce the level of the
workerswages. Also, for the environmentalists there could be more motiva-
tions behind the achievement of the environmental targets like for example
the increasing of the their budget. Especially for the environmental groups,
there is a variety of motivations which are strong enough to inuence the
groups motivations as well as the members personal targets. Thus in the
second chapter I analyse the motivations of the environmental groups and
their members.
Concretely, the purpose of the second chapter is to investigate the next is-
sues: Is the environmental defence the only motivation for the environmental
groups? Are there any other motivations? If yes, are the other motivations
altruistic? How do these motivations a¤ect the environmentalistsbehaviour,
priorities, aims and decisions? I point out that a positive relation exists be-
tween the group size and philanthropic contributions by third parties, like
grants from the government and donations by individuals. Hence, part of the
groups target is the increasing of the members which directly or indirectly
enhances the available budget. Moreover the membersanthropocentric im-
pure altruistic motivations like the rational economic pursuit, the warm glow
feeling, prestige, reputation, social status, egoism and other individualsas-
pirations characterise overall the group. So, three interrelated factors a¤ect
the strategy and the decisions of the group; the groups size, their budget
and the weight of impure altruism in their individual and collective objec-
tives. A positive relation exists between the groups size and the nancial
contribution and moreover, the interaction of the personal expectations with
the collective objectives encourages and benets the groups action. The
interaction between the personal expectations with the collective objectives
encourages and benets the groups action. The desire for personal gains en-
forces the selsh memberscontributions in the groups actions, undermines
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the free-riding and increases the groups payo¤.
In the third chapter the environmental groups participate in the Emissions
Trading System (ETS) in order to purchase and withdraw permits from the
market as a way to press the rms to adopt a better and less polluting tech-
nology. There are two rms in the tradable permits market which are acting
as monopolists in the product market. However, even if the two rms have
no relation in the product market there is strategic interaction in the permits
market. Also, the environmentalists are characterised with impure altruistic
motivation, like warm glow feeling, which can inuence their decision for the
number of withdrawn permits. We can observe that there is a U-shape rela-
tionship between how polluting the chosen technologies are and the degree of
impure altruism. Additionally, the participation of the environmentalists in
the ETS can induce the rms to adopt less polluting technologies than they
would be in the absence of the environmentalists but this is possible if the
environmentalists are characterised with intermediate values of impure al-
truism. Besides, under the intermediate values of impure altruism, the rms
will produce more and will pollute less under the environmentalistspartici-
pation than without the environmental groups. Furthermore, for high degrees
of impure altruism the presence of the environmental group in the ETS may
induce the rms to adopt a more polluting (non-green) technology but also
to produce less and thus, lower could be the level of emissions. Finally, for
relatively low level of impure altruism the environmentalistsparticipation
in the ETS could drive the rms to adopt a less-polluting technology than
in the absence of the environmentalists but the rms will produce more and
the level of the emissions could be higher with the environmentalists than
without them. Therefore, the level of the emissions depends from the trade
of between the "greenness" of the technology and the level of the production.
In the fourth chapter the inuence of the trade unions on the rmstech-
nological choice is analysed. Specically, two unionised rms compete à la
Cournot where both rms have to bargain with the unions for the level of the
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wages. In the rst case there are two, decentralised, unions in the market one
for each rm. In the second case the union is one, centralised and will bargain
with the two rms. However, the unions focus not only on the level of wages
and employment but also on the reduction of the emissions which emanate
from the rmsproduction as a by-product result. Contrary to the environ-
mental unions, the trade unions participate in the production of the goods
which have the responsibility for the pollution. I argue that, the centralisa-
tion could lead to lower level of pollution compared to the decentralisation
for relatively low size of the market. However, for relatively higher markets
size the decentralised structure could reduce the level of the rmspollution
more than the centralised case. Also, the decentralised structure could al-
ways provide higher incentives to the rms for the adoption of a better (less
polluting) technology. In addition, the rms have more prots under decen-
tralised unionisation than under centralised structure but the unions prefer
the centralisation. Interestingly, there is an inverse U-shape relation between
the rms level of emissions and the size of the market. Furthermore, the op-
timum wages and output (or employment) are characterised by an inverse
U-shape and an ordinary U-shape relation respectively with respect to the
values of the damage parameter.
In the conclusion I would like to note that, the motivation for the writing
of this thesis emanates from the real world experience and specically from
the social environmental movement since the end of 1960s. Given the direct
relation of the economic science with the social sciences, an aspect of the
real world experience is modelled according to the methodology of the eco-
nomic science. Concretely, the environmental movement is characterised by
support and participation of the environmental groups and the trade unions.
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the inuence of the envi-
ronmental movement on the rmsstrategy with respect to the technological
choice (and as a result to the level of output, prots etc) as well as on the
level of the rmsemissions. Thus, a theoretical microeconomic methodol-
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ogy (environmental, industrial and labour economics) is followed in order
to focus on the interaction between rms with trade unions and environ-
mental groups. It is argued that the inuence of the social environmental
movement (environmental groups and trade unions are part of it) on the
rmsdecisions and on the level of the environmental protection is strong
with some interesting aspects directly connected with the policy makersde-
cisions. Furthermore, the thesis reveals new ways for direct pressure to the
rms by environmental groups and trade unions for the improvement of the
environmental quality like; the environmentalistsdirect participation to the
tradable permits market or the trade unions-rms bargaining for wages and
anti-pollution technology. Finally, the dynamic of the environmental move-
ment could be an advantage for the regulator given that this movement may
accelerate the e¢ ciency of the environmental policy and could represent the
social attitude for the environmental issue.
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